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I. RE-CONCEPTUALIZING S ECURITY COUNCIL POWERS
¶1

¶2

In April 2007, the Security Council met to discuss the security implications of global
climate change. Framed by a British appeal for consideration of the item, deliberations focused
on the “threat” to international peace and security posed by the cumulative (and widely
publicized) effects of global warming. 1 In so doing, the Council treaded perilously close to the
legally operative language of Article 39 of the Charter, despite the fact that the meeting was a
largely political showing intended to raise the profile of climate change on the international
agenda. 2 That such “ecological” matters might constitute a threat to peace and security had been
asserted by the Council over a decade prior. 3 Nevertheless, the discretionary absorption of an
environmental item into the Council’s security domain provoked much consternation amongst
the “downtrodden underclass” of the U.N.—those Member States not privileged to sit on the
Council—who forcefully argued that the Council was not competent to consider such items and
was concomitantly encroaching upon the province of the U.N.’s other organs. 4 The discussion
highlighted growing unease with the U.N.’s ability to limit a Security Council increasingly wont
to exercise its impressive discretion by reference to security concerns, and its myriad powers
through the invocation of Chapter VII.
Chapter VII confers upon the Security Council the “primary responsibility for the
maintenance of international peace and security.”5 To this end, the Council may employ “such
action…as may be necessary to maintain or restore” it. 6 Such constitutional carte blanche, as
* Institute for International Law and Justice Scholar, New York University School of Law; Legal Advisor for the
Permanent Mission of Palau to the United Nations; LL.M., 2007, New York University School of Law; J.D., 2006,
New York University School of Law, BA, 1999, Stanford University. An incredible debt of gratitude is owed to
Simon Chesterman, whose inspiration, wise counsel and good offices over the years have made my work possible.
Thanks also to Benedict Kingsbury, Philip Alston, Thomas Franck and the entire IILJ community—particularly Liz
Sepper and Emily Berman—for their insights and input.
1
The Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Letter dated 5 April
2007 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the
United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2007/186 (Apr. 5, 2007).
2
The Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Annex to the letter
dated 5 April 2007 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/2007/186 (Apr.
5, 2007).
3
See President of the Security Council, Note by the President of the Security Council, at 3, delivered to the Security
Council, U.N. Doc. S/23500 (Jan. 31, 1992) ( “[t]he absence of war and military conflicts amongst States does not in
itself ensure international peace and security. The non-military sources of instability in the economic, social,
humanitarian and ecological fields have become threats to peace and security”).
4
First Climate Debate Divides UN, BBC News, Apr. 18, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6562251.stm.
5
U.N. Charter art. 24, para. 1 (allocating authority “in order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United
Nations.”).
6
U.N. Charter art. 42.

Vol. 6:1]

¶3

¶4

¶5

Jared Schott

well as the Council’s increasing invocation of Chapter VII to justify quasi- legislative and quasijudicial actions, gives cause for concern to detractors wary of an unrepresentative Council whose
powers continue to broaden in scope faster than do corresponding guarantors of accountability
and legitimacy. South Africa has noted that, “[o]ften, the Council has resorted to Chapter VII of
the Charter as an umbrella for addressing issues that may not necessarily pose a threat to
international peace and security, when it could have opted for alternative provisions of the
Charter to respond more appropriately, utilizing other provisions of the same Charter.”7
This encroachment has concerned diplomats and academics alike. The academic literature
examining this phenomenon reveals a struggle to adequately grasp the limits of Security Council
authority, alternating uncomfortably between Council-as-political-body, Council-as-juridicalbody and Council-as-anachronism. As Judge Shahabuddeen has inquired (and perhaps implicitly
lamented), “Are there any limits to the Council’s power of appreciation . . . . If there are any
limits, what are those limits and what body, if other than the Security Council, is competent to
say what those limits are?”8
“If angels were to govern men,”9 such inquiry would simply be academic exercise.
However, the Council’s generous interpretation of its powers has created a schism within the
U.N. that has hindered the organization’s effectiveness. What is more, the Council has
conspicuously justified practices violative of fundamental precepts of human rights law by
reference to the exceptional nature of its Chapter VII authority. At the same time, the Council’s
inconsistent and ad hoc use of its vast discretionary powers has frustrated the development of a
robust framework–be it legal, institutional or normative–to contain such powers. 10 With this in
mind, this article aims to better define the Security Council’s powers under Chapter VII, as well
any constraints thereon, from both a positive and normative perspective. It contends that there is
indeed a juridical framework which holds the promise of limits and coherence for Council
Chapter VII action. In brief, it conceptualizes the nature of and constraints on Security Council
power through the instructive application of emergency doctrine to Chapter VII action.
In order to scrutinize the Security Council’s Chapter VII powers through the lens of
emergency, this article conceives of emergency doctrine as a regulative ideal for the Council’s
invocation of Chapter VII. The term, a Kantian device, 11 is used to link Chapter VII practice and
emergency powers both descriptively and normatively. 12 It concedes that the perfect
superimposition of the doctrine of legitimate emergency onto Council practice is “essentially
unrealizable,” but nevertheless holds that such counterfactual criteria can and should guide our
practice. 13 Conceptualizing emergency powers as a regulative ideal facilitates exploring the
paradigm of domestic emergency in order to explain the concept of Council power, and to use
the ideal of emergency as a criterion by which we can assess, criticize and ultimately structure
7

U.N. SCOR, 62d Sess., 5615th mtg. at 17, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5615 (Jan. 8, 2007).
Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at
Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. US), 1992 I.C.J. 114, 142 (Apr. 14) (separate opinion of Judge
Shahabuddeen) [hereinafter Lockerbie].
9
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
10
At the very least, the emergence of authoritative interpretations and customary law by means of subsequent
practice is made exceedingly difficult, and norm creation is compromised. See M ARGARET KARNS & KAREN
M INGST , INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: THE POLITICS AND PROCESSES OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 51 (2004).
11
See IMMANUEL KANT , THE CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON (Paul Guyer & Allen Wood trans., 1999).
12
See, e.g., DOROTHY EMMET , THE ROLE OF THE UNREALISABLE: A STUDY IN REGULATIVE IDEALS (1994); see also
Kenneth Abraham, The Expectations Principle as a Regulative Ideal 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 59 (1998).
13
See, e.g., Pablo de Greiff, Deliberative Democracy and Punishment, 5 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 373, 381-82 (2002);
Drucilla Cornell, Toward a Modern/Postmodern Reconstruction of Ethics, 133 U. PA. L. RE V. 291, 298 (1985).
8
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Chapter VII praxis. As this article will show, the construct of a regulative ideal for Council
action based in emergency doctrine is neither arbitrary nor fanciful. Empirical parallels and
congruent theoretical underpinnings suggest that the limiting principles of emergency doctrine
should guide the invocation of and exercise of powers under Chapter VII.
The remainder of this article is divided into four sections. The remainder of Section I
discusses the exceptional nature of Chapter VII and Emergency Doctrine, and explains why the
doctrine of emergency is an appropriate prism through which to view and analyze the Security
Council’s Chapter VII powers. Section II analyzes the prerequisite determination of a threat to
international peace and security under Article 39 of the Charter, applying the lexicon and
jurisprudence of emergency declarations. The Section considers theoretical and empirical
limitations on domestic declarations, and analogous constraints on the Security Council’s vast
discretion under Article 39.
Section III argues that boundaries are more suitable—and more likely to be enforced—in
the exercise of the actual emergency powers themselves. Nevertheless, it notes a disturbing
empirical trend in the exercise of Chapter VII powers, one which again mirrors a trend in
domestic emergency regimes. Section IV looks at the exercise of Chapter VII powers outside of
the Security Council where the vast majority of enforcement actions occur: namely, Councilauthorized and -delegated action. It observes a number of derogations from international law,
rationalized solely by the exceptional need to maintain and restore international peace and
security. Finally, it argues that more must be done to confine Chapter VII exceptionalism and
ensure that the powers it entrusts to other entities are not abused.
A. The Exceptional Nature of Chapter VII and Emergency

¶8

¶9

The doctrine of emergency is an appropriate construct by which to analyze the Security
Council’s Chapter VII powers for many reasons. The tension between law and security,
exacerbated by the failure to define whether security is a primary or exclusive concern, pervades
both the invocation and exercise of powers under Chapter VII and emergency alike. In both
domestic emergency and Council resort to Chapter VII, the acting authority enjoys great
discretion in determining that a threat to security exists, and implementing those measures
deemed necessary to restore and maintain “normalcy.” This discretion, rooted in the need for
flexibility and decisive action in existential matters, assumes a partly political character as it
transcends the rigid legal rules of the “normal” system. Yet both sets of powers have proven
themselves vulnerable to unaccountable and illegitimate practice. Domestic emergency regimes
tend to become normalized, as states of emergency extend beyond temporal and spatial divides
and emergency powers become an ordinary technique of governance. In the process, substantive
and procedural constitutional checks are bypassed, separations of power erode, and arbitrary
governmental action becomes the norm, bolstered by judicial deference.
Similar phenomena are apparent in the evolution of Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. The
Council’s inconsistent and ambiguous practice has eluded the imposition of any binding
substantive or procedural constraints which can be gleaned from the Charter. What is more,
against the backdrop of inadequate judicial review, the Council has broadly construed its powers
under Chapter VII and expanded its jurisdiction from traditional matters of security to new
spheres previously under the purview of other organs and non-U.N. entities. Likewise, the
Council has over time assumed quasi- legislative and quasi- judicial functions under Chapter VII,
straining conceptions of propriety and institutional competence. In so doing, it puts at risk the

26
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constitutionalism and republicanism ingrained in the Charter, and compromises the
accountability and legitimacy of the Council—if not the U.N. as a whole. 14
¶10
Notwithstanding these indiscretions, neither emergency powers nor Chapter VII exist
outside of the law. Although they transcend the rigidity of ordinary legal rules, they remain
subject to broader constitutional standards. Within the domestic realm, these standards are
actualized through the jurisprudence and doctrine of legitimate emergency; at the international
level, the U.N. has yet to adequately effectuate the Charter’s limiting principles, though an
adherence to legalism permeates Council practice. With this in mind, this article argues that the
theory and practice of emergency provide both a basis for assessing Council action, as well as
limits by which to legitimize it. The architecture of emergency powers offers valuable
descriptive and normative insights into the legal space in which the Security Council operates.
By comparing it to relevant domestic empirical and jurisprudential practice, the article suggests
reforms and mechanisms through which Council action can be executed accountably and
efficaciously.
¶11
Second, the paradigm of emergency is an apt framework through which to view Chapter
VII powers because it succeeds in capturing the complexities of the Council’s place within the
international legal system in ways that other frameworks cannot. Simplistically rigid legal
approaches fail to adequately account for the Council’s role in the creation of international law,
as well as its ability to derogate from international law when acting to uphold or restore
international peace and security. 15 On the other hand, theories of a purely political Council fail
to give proper weight to the distinct adherence to legalism permeating the Council’s work, as
well as the constitutional primacy of the Charter operating on the Council through both legal and
accountability mechanisms. More “centrist” doctrines such as implied powers work well where
necessity and the language of the Charter operate along the same vector 16 ; however, where one is
pitted against the other, as in the cases of human rights violations explored later, it presents an
14

The concept of accountability “implies that some actors have the right to hold other actors to a set of standards, to
judge whether they have fulfilled their responsibilities in light of these standards, and to impose sanctions if they
determine that these responsibilities have not been met.” Ruth W. Grant & Robert O. Keohane, Accountability and
Abuses of Power in World Politics, 99 A M. POL. SCI . REV. 29 (2005). Legitimacy, a similarly elastic concept,
implicates an entity’s credibility, sometimes as a function of the “fairness” with which it acts. See THOMAS
FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS (1995). It is alternatively defined by Franck as “a
property of a rule or rulemaking institution which itself exerts a pull toward compliance on those addressed
normatively because those addressed believe that the rule or institution has come into being and operates in
accordance with generally accepted principles;” with respect to international organizations and their organs,
legitimacy typically requires “some combination of conformity to shared norms and to established law.” THOMAS
FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 24 (1990).
15
M ARTEN ZWANENBURG, A CCOUNTABILITY OF PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS 156 (2005).
16
The rule of implied powers is perhaps best stated by the International Court of Justice in its Reparations for
Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations Advisory Opinion. There, in determining that the United
Nations had the authority to bring a claim on behalf of its employees, the Court stated that an organization such as
the United Nations “must be deemed to have those powers which, though not expressly provided in the Charter, are
conferred upon it by necessary implication as being essential to the performance of its duties.” Reparations for
Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. 174, 182 (Apr. 11) [hereinafter
Reparations]. See also Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (SouthWest Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16, 52 (Jun.
21) [hereinafter Legal Consequences] (“the powers of the Council under Article 24 are not restricted to the specific
grants of authority contained in Chapters VI, VII, VIII and XII… [T]he Members of the United Nations have
conferred upon the Security Council powers commensurate with its responsibility for the maintenance of peace and
security”). Consider also the minimalist “inherent powers” variation of the doctrine, seen in Certain Expenses of the
United Nations (Art. 17, para . 2, of the Charter), Advisory Opinion, 1962 I.C.J. 151, 168 (Jul. 20) (“when the
Organization takes action which warrants the assertion that it was appropriate for the fulfilment of one of the stated
purposes of the United Nations, the presumption is that such action is not ultra vires the Organization”).
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under- nuanced and insufficiently robust conceptualization of the fundamentally different nature
of Chapter VII power.
¶12
Emergency provides a more accurate and comprehensive treatment in both its normative
treatments and empirical realities. 17 Though an “immanent tension between facticity and
validity”18 marks the exception, emergency doctrine takes a constitutional approach where the
primary benchmarks of legitimate emergency are not specific rules, but rather standards
supported by secondary rules. 19 This constitutionalism is no mere chimerical device; it is the
dispositive link between the concepts of Chapter VII and emergency. As an organ of the U.N.,
the Council derives its authority from the Charter, an international compact delegating Member
State authority and conferring the resulting enforcement power on the Council. 20 But the Charter
is no mere treaty; it is king among all treaties. 21 It is a constitution, “reflect[ing] constitutional
principles . . . in force long before the Charter was drafted,” and incorporating them into a new
legal order. 22 As the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY has observed, this constitutionality has
significant ramifications for the exercise of Council power:
The Security Council is an organ of an international organization, established by a
treaty which serves as a constitutional framework for that organization. The
Security Council is thus subjected to certain constitutional limitations, however
broad its powers under the constitution may be. Those powers cannot, in any case,
go beyond the limits of the jurisdiction of the Organization at large, not to
mention other specific limitations or those which may derive from the internal
division of power within the Organization. In any case, neither the text nor the
spirit of the Charter conceives of the Security Council as legibus solutus (unbound
by law). 23
From its inception, then, despite the Council’s jurisdiction over security and its license to
respond essentially “as it sees fit,” juridical bounds have always existed, as the Charter has
17

For fuller treatises on the theory and history of emergency doctrine, see GIORGIO A GAMBEN, THE STATE OF
EXCEPTION (Kevin Attell trans., 2005); CLINT ON ROSSITER, CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP (1948); OREN GROSS
& FIONNUALA NÍ A OLÁIN, LAW IN TIMES OF CRISIS: EMERGENCY POWERS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 19 (2006);
DAVID DYZENHAUS, THE CONSTITUTION OF LAW : LEGALITY IN A TIME OF EMERGENCY (2006); CARL SCHMITT , THE
CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL 26 (George Schwab trans., 1976); see also JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF
GOVERNMENT §§159-62 (1691) (on the prerogative).
18
JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND
DEMOCRACY 9 (William Rehg trans. 1996) [hereinafter BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS]
19
See RICHARD POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT : THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY (2006).
20
DANESH SAROOSHI, THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY: THE DELEGATION
BY THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL OF ITS CHAPTER VII POWERS 26-27 (1999).
21
Under Article 103, “[i]n the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations
under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the
present Charter shall prevail.” U.N. Charter art. 103 (emphasis added).
22
BARDO FASSBENDER, U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM AND THE RIGHT OF VETO: A CONSTITUTIONAL
PERSPECTIVE 99 (1998); see also id. at 27 (citing HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 124-25
(1945)). Beyond the “constitutional moment” of its postwar drafting and enactment, Thomas Franck distinguishes
the Charter as a constitution along several other dimensions: its “pervasive perpetuity,” and universality; its
indelibleness, and entrenched provisions; its primacy, as ordained by Article 103; and its institutional autochthony,
establishing parameters but ultimately engendering a self-perpetuating entity. Thomas Franck, Is the U.N. Charter a
Constitution?, in NEGOTIATING FOR PEACE : LIBER A MICORUM TONO EITEL 95 (Jochen Abr. Frowein et al. eds.,
2003).
23
Prosecutor v. Duško Tadic Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on the Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on
Jurisdiction, ¶ 28 (Oct. 2, 1995).
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provided standards to ensure—as opposed to rigidly dictate—legitimate and accountable Council
action. In Chapter VII and elsewhere, protocols and standards exist to limit the otherwise free
hand of the Council under Chapter VII.
¶13
The doctrine of emergency ably effectuates the limiting “superordinate legal principles”24
of the Charter. It provides the contours for mechanisms of governance and exercises of power
fundamentally congruent to those of Chapter VII. It confines executive discretion within the
bounds of genuine exception while protecting against arbitrary and illegitimate uses of
emergency power. Perhaps most importantly, it offers a valuable paradigm through which
aspirations towards a constitutionalized international law can be reconciled with the Security
Council’s intrinsically political nature and prodigious powers. In the end, the propositions put
forth by this article echo the theme of a contemporary international legal system “less coherent
and reassuring than the old one,” “yet . . . several steps up the evolutionary ladder.”25 Such a
tradeoff is certainly a worthwhile venture if we are to perpetuate a constitutional, albeit uneasy,
coexistence among Chapter VII, the provisions of the Charter, and international law generally.
II. DETERMINATION AS DECLARATION
¶14

Article 39 is the gatekeeper of Chapter VII, the threshold at which the Council changes
from multilateral organ into global executive sans pareil. Under its terms,
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace,
breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or
decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to
maintain or restore international peace and security. 26

If the Security Council seeks to invoke the binding powers of Articles 41 and 42 to enforce its
decisions, the plain language of the Charter dictates that it must make a determination of any (1)
threat to the peace, (2) breach of the peace, or (3) act of aggression. Only then may the Security
Council employ a broad array of powers, including the use of force and coercive measures,
making such determination “a caveat which bestows upon the Security Council a power of
appreciation not easily subject to control.”27 Notably, the provisions of Article 39 itself are
seemingly the only component of Chapter VII less given to limitation than the myriad offspring
powers, a point evidenced by the ambiguous text of Article 39 and subsequent practice.
¶15
Much as the Article 39 determination acts as formal requisite to the exercise of Chapter
VII powers, so too does the declaration of emergency enable the appropriate domestic body to
invoke hitherto proscribed authorities. In both systems, though the acting body has often been
complicit in the expansion of exception beyond constitutional bounds, both theory and practice
militate against overly rigid constraints. The remainder of this Section identifies and evaluates
procedural and substantive restraints on domestic discretion in declaring emergency, as well as
24

See JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE DIVIDED WEST (Ciaran Cronin ed., trans., 2006); see also JÜRGEN HABERMAS,
Kant’s Idea of Perpetual Peace: At Two Hundred Years’ Historical Remove, in THE INCLUSION OF THE OTHER:
STUDIES IN POLITICAL THEORY 165 (Ciaran Cronin & Pablo de Greiff eds., 2000).
25
Andrea Bianchi, Ad-Hocism and the Rule of Law, 13 EUR . J. INT ’L L. 263, 269 (2002) (citing Georges Abi Saab,
Cours général de droit international public, 207 RdC (1987-VII), at 460).
26
U.N. Charter art. 39.
27
Mariano J. Aznar-Gómez, A Decade of Human Rights Protection by the U.N. Security Council: A Sketch of
Deregulation?, 13 EUR. J. INT ’L. L. 223, 234 (2002).
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those placed upon Council discretion in the application of Article 39. It finds that the imposition
of robust substantive constraints has frequently failed due to the inherently political nature of the
determination, in concert with timid judicial review. Indeed, the architecture of domestic
emergency systems suggests that legitimizing principles are best channeled through procedural
limits. Though such procedural limits can rectify the most egregious infirmities in Council
practice, they do not negate the need for more potent constraints. Rather, substantive limits are
better applied to the exercise of Chapter VII (“emergency”) powers themselves.
A. The Procedural Characteristics of Emergency Declaration
¶16

Though unable to shape the content of the emergency state, procedural limits “beget
legitimacy”28 by ensuring that the commencement of emergency is transparent and predictable.
By no means is the imposition of procedural constraints uniform across domestic systems, nor
are constraints uniformly honored where in existence. Where honored, though, they act as
emergency-specific secondary rules and proxy for less articulable constitutional precepts.
¶17
Two kinds of procedural requirements generally arise within the context of emergency
powers. The first is an actual declaration; that is, the declarer must provide notice of the
declaration with supporting details. In so providing, a government makes the argument that it is
legally justified in departing from specified legal commitments, as opposed to simply stating that
it is derogating as a matter of fact. 29
¶18
Domestically, where the requirement exists, declarations of a state of emergency are
typically published in the official register, 30 though some countries require broadcast
dissemination of the details.31 At the international level, major treaties require a dual- notice
system of both domestic proclamation and international notification. The International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) requires that states declaring an emergency, under which
they intend to derogate from the provisions of the Covenant, commit themselves to official
proclamation at home and immediate international notification containing “full information
about the measures taken and a clear explanation of the reasons for them, with full
documentation attached regarding [the country’s] law.”32 Even when treaties do not require
domestic proclamation, courts have found that, regardless, some “formal and public act of
derogation” is needed to avoid the sanction of nullity. 33 Other treaties similarly provide for
international reporting, with a regional split as to whether the termination of measures should be
28

BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 18, at 135.
SUBRATA ROY CHOWDHURY, RULE OF LAW IN A STATE OF EMERGENCY: THE PARIS M INIMUM STANDARDS OF
HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS IN A STATE OF EMERGENCY 11 (1989).
30
In Israel, declarations are published in the Reshumot. See Basic Law: The Government, 2001, S.H. 158, ¶ 38(d).
In Turkey, declarations are published in the Official Gazette. See State of Emergency Law art. 3(2) (Oct. 25, 1983),
available at
http://www.qub.ac.uk/schools/SchoolofLaw/Research/HumanRightsCentre/Resources/html/Filetoupload,53211,en.h
tm.
31
State of Emergency Law, supra note 30, at art. 3(4) (stating “[t]he reasons for the decision to declare a state of
emergency, its duration and scope shall be broadcast on Turkish radio and television and, if the Council of Ministers
deem it necessary, also disseminated through other media.”).
32
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), at arts. 4, 40, U.N. GAOR, 21st
Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter ICCPR]; Human Rights Committee, General
Comment No. 29: States of Emergency (Article 4), ¶ 17, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (Aug. 31, 2001)
[hereinafter General Comment No. 29].
33
See, e.g., American Convention on Human Rights art. 27, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter ACHR];
JAIME ORAÁ, HUMAN RIGHTS IN STATES OF EMERGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 37 (1992).
29
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provided for prospectively. 34 In practice though, short, over-generalized and justification- lacking
reports plague the system, 35 with inconsistent judicial rebuke for such failures. 36
¶19
The second significant procedural check on declarations of emergency relates to the
allocation of authority between branches of government, and determines the channels through
which states may validly make such declarations. This allocation tends to reflect broader
normative conceptions regarding separation of powers and legitimacy. For instance, German law
historically required that the head of state issue such declarations, while the “dominant principle
in the French tradition” has been that such power resides in parliament alone. 37 The Roman
system left full discretion to the executive Consuls, although in practice the Senate proposed
recommendations. 38 Where countries assign the power of declaration to the executive, some
form of ratification, such as ministerial counter-signatures, parliamentary authorization or simply
parliamentary notification, is often constitutionally required. 39 Other countries place declaratory
powers primarily in the hands of the parliamentary body. 40 The existence of such provisions
reflects both the need for legitimacy in the context of emergency declarations and the inadequacy
of substantive checks on such a discretionary matter.
B. The Substantive Criteria of the Emergency Declaration
¶20

Central to any proper consideration of a declaration of emergency is whether the turmoil
underlying the declared state qualifies as a genuine emergency. Here, theory diverges from
practice, and formal law is divorced from its enforceability. This is not to say that formal
substantive requirements for a declaration of emergency are particularly demanding; in fact,
more often than not the majority of the exercise is left to the discretion of the declarer.
¶21
Cognizant of the free hand given to the declaratory authority, academic approaches to
establishing legitimizing constraints have focused on cabining discretion within finite normative
bounds as opposed to inflexible legal rules. Imminence is one such requirement. The U.N.commissioned Questiaux report advises that a declaration of emergency is only justified by
danger that is “extreme and imminent”; the International Law Association uses the phrase
“actual or imminent.”41 A second criterion relates to the scope and gravity of the threat. The
threat must be of such a magnitude, directed at “the organized existence of the community which
34

See, e.g., ACHR, supra note 33, at art. 27.3 (requiring a prospective termination date); see also Richard B. Lillich,
Queensland Guidelines for Bodies Monitoring Respect for Human Rights During States of Emergency, 85 A M. J.
INT ’L L. 716, 717 (1991) [hereinafter Queensland Guidelines]; cf. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms art. 15, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention] (requiring
only post hoc report on termination).
35
ORAÁ, supra note 33, at 76-77.
36
See Lawless v. Ireland, 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) 72-73 (1960-61) (Report of the Commission) (holding that
inadequate reporting could not in itself nullify Irish derogations); see also Brogan & Others v. United Kingdom,
145-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 16 (1988).
37
A GAMBEN, supra note 17, at 12.
38
GROSS & NÍ A OLÁIN, supra note 17, at 24.
39
For a list of citations to such provisions, see id., at 56.
40
See, e.g., XIAN FA [Constitution] art. 67, § 20 (1982) (P.R.C.), available at http://english.gov.cn/200508/05/content_20813.htm; see also Basic Law: The Government, 2001, S.H. 158, ¶ 38(d) (delegating the power to
determine and declare emergencies to the Knesset, as well as sole authority to ratify and renew Governmental
declarations).
41
U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm. on Prevention of Discrimination & Prot. Of Minorities,
Study of Implications for Human Rights of Recent Developments Concerning Situations Known as States of Siege or
Emergency, ¶ 23, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1982/15 (Jul, 27, 1982) (prepared by Nicole Questiaux) [hereinafter
Questiaux] (emphasis added); CHOWDHURY, supra note 29, at 11.
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forms the basis of the State,”42 that a state of emergency is “indispensable to the preservation of
the state and its constitutional order.”43 Moreover, the “whole of the population or the whole
population of the area to which the declaration applies” must be affected. 44 The threat must also
be “temporary” in nature, with measures aimed to reinstate prior conditions as soon as possible. 45
¶22
Some of the principles promoted in these definitional criteria appear in the varying laws of
domestic systems —at least formally. One such constraint is the stratification of emergency.
Under constitutional systems, the level of emergency declared determines the methods of
declaration, the duration of the state of emergency and the subsequent scope of powers. 46 In
some cases, this simply reflects the unintended creep of emergency powers from matters of
existential magnitude into non-security-related areas. 47 However, a practice common to
Continental Europe provides for the more robust check of subdividing their security-related
emergency provisions based on the gravity of the situation faced. 48 The plain text of the U.N.
charter also offers a potentially comparable taxonomy that—between a threat to the peace,
breach of the peace and act of aggression—has eluded consistent practice and formal criteria.
¶23
A second constitutional restraint involves the use of temporal and territorial limits. Sunset
clauses provide for the automatic termination of states of emergency without an affirmative
renewal or extension, typically by other legislative channels. Authorities charged with
declaratory powers may also specify the applicability of the state of exception to the whole or
parts of the country. 49 Such provisions allow for more narrowly tailored responses consistent
with principles of necessity and proportionality. They have a darker side as well, however,
imposing separate lega l rights and duties on citizens of various regions, often according to
ethnoreligious demography.
¶24
The final constitutional requirement noted here is imminence. The present French
constitution requires that French institutions, independence or territoria l integrity must be
“seriously and immediately threatened”50 in order for a state of emergency to be declared. Sri
Lanka requires that the emergency in fact exist or be at least imminent. 51 Under international
law, states of emergency must respond to an actual or imminent crisis; those “of a preventive
nature” are unlawful. 52 Such provisions, if enforced, significantly cut back on the potentially
infinite justifications available to the declaratory power.
42

Questiaux, supra note 41, at ¶ 23.
ROSSITER, supra note 17, at 298-99.
44
CHOWDHURY, supra note 29, at 11.
45
ROSSITER, supra note 19, at 300.
46
See GROSS & NÍ A OLÁIN, supra note 17, at 41-43.
47
For instance, Turkey differentiates between violence/public order emergencies and those relating to natural
disasters. See THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY arts. 119-20 (1982) (Turk.). In Latin and South
American countries nine different states of exception are provided for. GROSS & NÍ A OLÁIN, supra note 17, at 42.
48
For instance, the Dutch Constitution distinguishes between a “state of siege,” “state of emergency” and “state of
war.” GRONDWET [GW .] [Constitution] arts. 96, 103 (1815) (Neth.). Under the Portuguese Constitution, a state of
“siege” may be declared where there exists “actual or imminent aggression by foreign forces, serious threat to or
disturbance of the democratic constitutional order or public calamity.” A state of “emergency,” though, is
applicable to circumstances “less serious” than those delineated above. CONSTITUTION OF THE PORTUGUESE
REPUBLIC art. 19 (1976) (Port.), available at http://www.parlamento.pt/ingles/cons_leg/crp_ing/index.html; see also
GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] arts. 12, 80, 87, 91, 115 (1993) (F.R.G.).
49
See, e.g., Public Security Ordinance, Ordinance No. 25, §5 (1947) (Sri Lanka), available at
http://www.tamilnation.org/srilankalaws/47publicsecurity.htm.
50
LA CONST ITUTION art. 16 (1958) (Fr.), available at http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/english/8ab.asp.
51
Radhika Coomaraswamy & Charmaine de los Reyes, Rule by Emergency: Sri Lanka’s Postcolonial Constitutional
Experience, 2 INT ’L J. CONST . L. 272, 275 (2004).
52
ORAÁ, supra note 33, at 27.
43
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¶25

Still, many countries impose few if any restraints on the declaration of emergency. Sri
Lanka’s Public Security Ordinance provides that the Governor-General may declare an
emergency where he is “of the opinion that it is expedient to do” so, making such regulations
appear “necessary or expedient ” in the interests of public security. 53 Needless to say, such terms
do not make for judicially enforceable standards. Even where unchecked political discretion is
less blatant, it is not necessarily any more circumscribed, as the use of broad and malleable
terms—“public order,” “security,” “liberal-democratic constitution”—provides little hindrance to
government entities seeking to justify exceptional alterations in the power structure.
¶26
The major international human rights instruments provide a second legal check on
declarations through built- in derogation provisions that simultaneously allow for this
inevitability while establishing principled bounds. It is this international system that provides the
theoretical contours for states of emergency. The United Kingdom, in a Commission on Human
Rights Drafting Committee, first introduced the idea of a derogation provision, and thereby
sparked a subsequent debate in the ICCPR drafting consultations about how broadly to construe
the circumstances allowing for derogatio n. 54 Countries sought to limit the elasticity of the
“emergency” term, and debated whether an explicit list of non-derogable provisions was the
proper solution. 55 In the end, article 4(1) of the ICCPR provides that:
In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the
existence of which is officially proclaimed, the States Parties to the present
Covenant may take measures derogating from their obligations under the present
Covenant to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation,
provided that such measures are not inconsistent with their other obligations
under international law and do not involve discrimination solely on the ground of
race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin. 56
Subsequent interpretation by the Human Rights Committee further define the terms of Article 4,
adding to the meaning of “strictly required” by noting that “the restoration of a state of
normalcy…must be the predominant objective,” and the emergency must be limited by
“duration, geographical coverage and material scope.”57 The derogation provisions of the other
major instruments are consonant with Article 4 of the ICCPR, differing primarily in terminology
and the inclusion of an explicit nondiscrimination provision. 58 On the whole, these provisions
provide firm and unambiguous limits on emergency powers, as well as seemingly justiciable
procedural requirements and normative declaratory requirements. The force of these principled
checks, however, has been blunted by inconsistent judicial review at the domestic and
international levels.
53

Public Security Ordinance, supra note 49, at § 5.
See OFFICE OF THE U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE A DMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE:
A M ANUAL ON HUMAN RIGHTS FOR JUDGES, PROSECUTORS AND LAWYERS 816-17, U.N. Doc. HR/P/PT/9, U.N.
Sales No. E.02.XIV.3 (2003), available at
http://www.ohchr.org/english/about/publications/docs/CHAPTER_16.pdf.
55
Id. at 818 (citing U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.195 ¶ 69).
56
ICCPR, supra note 32, at art. 4(1).
57
General Comment No. 29, supra note 32, at ¶¶2 , 4; see also U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm.
on Prevention of Discrimination & Prot. Of Minorities, Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation
Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Annex, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1984/4 (1984),
available at http://hei.unige.ch/~clapham/hrdoc/docs/siracusa.html.
58
ACHR, supra note 33, at art. 27; European Convention, supra note 34, at art. 15.
54
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C. Judicial Review of Declarations: An Unruly Margin of Appreciation?
¶27

Within the domestic context, judicial review is particularly troublesome. Even where a
strong and independent judiciary exists, the declaration of emergency is typically a decision
made at the discretion of the executive or parliament. Typically, great deference is shown to the
decisions of those bodies charged with jurisdiction over national security, and judges are hesitant
to invalidate measures when doing so might put national security at risk. 59 Further, questions of
justiciability emerge as judges struggle to locate “judicially discoverable and manageable
standards”60 in policy areas in which they have little expertise. A final infirmity of domestic
judicial review lies in its enforceability. Even where judicial review does invalidate
governmental action, the other branches of government typically respond quickly to change the
laws so as to allow for actions they have hitherto deemed necessary for public security. 61
¶28
Such judicial give-and-take is not a phenomenon unique to countries with traditionally
underdeveloped judicial systems, nor those with commanding executive branches. 62 It has often
been up to supranational judicial systems to effectuate bona fide review, with inconsistent
results. 63 The work of treaty bodies and international courts of review has not met the lofty
Queensland aspirations, suggesting that the principles of legitimate emergency are less binding
than ideal. 64 Lacking truly effective fact- finding mechanisms, international courts have been
reluctant to question the discretion of national governments in determining that a state of
emergency is justified. 65 For this reason and others, international courts have accorded a “wide
margin of appreciation” to States party to international instruments in their declarations of
emergency. Earlier European Court of Human Rights cases adhered to this “margin of
appreciation” and deferred to government determinations despite serious questions about the
existence of a public emergency. 66
¶29
Where courts have intervened, it is often due to politics. The European Commission was
widely seen to be censuring Greece’s military government in finding that no emergency existed
to justify repressive measures undertaken in the wake of the “National Revolution” in 1967. 67 In
many ways, the case is a microcosm of European regional emergency jurisprudence, the
59

See, e.g., Australian Communist Party v. Commonwealth (1951) 83 C.L.R. 1 (Austl.) (holding that the validity of
the Communist Party Dissolution Act does not depend upon proof of the facts recited in the preamble as justification
for the Act.).
60
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
61
Following a Sri Lankan Supreme Court decision asserting powers of review over emergency declarations and
measures, the government responded with a constitutional amendment prohibiting judicial review of emergency
proclamations. See, e.g., Joseph Perera v. Attorney General [1992] 1 S.L.R. 199 (Sri Lanka ); THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE REPUBLIC OF SRI LANKA art. 154(J)(2) (1978), available at
http://www.priu.gov.lk/Cons/1978Constitution/1978ConstitutionWithoutAmendments.pdf; see also Coomaraswamy
& de los Reyes, supra note 51, at 287-88.
62
See, e.g., A. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2004] UKHL 56, [2005] 2 A.C. 87 (appeal taken
from Eng.) (U.K.) (calling for deference to determinations of emergency, even where government has conceded no
attack is imminent).
63
See GROSS & NÍ A OLÁIN , supra note 17, at 8-13.
64
Queensland Guidelines, supra note 34, at 718 (arguing for an objective determination of whether a public
emergency actually existed and whether proper procedures were followed).
65
GROSS & NÍ A OLÁIN, supra note 17, at 267.
66
See, e.g., Lawless v. Ireland, 3 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 56, 84 (1960-61) (Court decision); see also Brannigan &
McBride v. United Kingdom, 258-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 34 (1993).
67
Greek Case, 1969 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 12, 186 (Eur. Comm'n on H.R.); see James Becket, The Greek Case
before the European Human Rights Commission, 1 HUM. RTS. 91, 113 (1970); see also GROSS & NÍ A OLÁIN, supra
note 17, at 275.
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somewhat hollow assertion of judicial authority enervated by the supremacy of political
considerations. The European experience speaks to the impressive discretion of the “declarer”
and the ultimately political nature of the exercise. Though courts may rule on procedural matters
and require some evidence supporting the validity of a determination, they have proven
unwilling, if not unable, to hold governmental authorities to substantive requirements mandated
by treaty and theory.
¶30
By contrast, the now-obsolete United Nations Human Rights Committee (HRC) undertook
a more substantive approach to review, but was hampered by its advisory nature. 68 This “soft”
global review, while nonbinding, evidenced a universal awareness of the abuse of emergency
regimes, as well as a normative sentiment supporting accountability and transparency in
invoking emergency. Nevertheless, deep and searching review of Member State reports by and
large eluded the HRC, which frequently had to stop at procedural review focusing on insufficient
evidence in the face of egregiously inadequate Member State reports. 69
¶31
The legal, political and practical challenges of using judicial review to counteract improper
declarations of emergency, as well as the possible impropriety of doing so, suggest that
substantive and legal constraints may more ably and effectively guide the exercise of emergency
powers themselves, as opposed to the preceding declaration. Still, objective criteria and
corresponding restraints have appeared at times within the system, and may well prove more
applicable in the context of Article 39.
D. The Carte Blanche Determination of a Threat to the Peace…
¶32

It is only once an Article 39 determination is made that the Security Council can move
beyond its “regular” fact-finding and recommendatory powers to the “exceptional” powers of
Chapter VII. 70 Like a declaration of emergency, Article 39 acts as not simply precursor to, but
also justification for, the exercise of such powers.
1. The Charter and the Council’s Lone Discretion…

¶33

Much as emergency declarations can be a primarily political act of discretion, the Article
39 determination is regarded as the central repository of Council discretion within the Charter.
As initially presented at Dumbarton Oaks, Article 39 (at the time, Section VIII-B) consisted of a
transition to enforcement measures in two paragraphs. 71 The first, rejected as unnecessary, dealt
with the specific instance of a failed dispute settlement as constituting a threat to international
peace and security. The second contained the provisions that now constitute Article 39,
68

Many States disregarded Committee requests and findings. See, e.g., U.N. Human Rights Comm., Report of the
Human Rights Committee, ¶ 108, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/34/40 (Sept. 27, 1979); U.N.
Human Rights Comm., Report of the Human Rights Committee, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc.
A/39/40 (Sept. 20, 1984).
69
See ORAÁ, supra note 33, at 21 (citing U.N. Human Rights Comm., Report of the Human Rights Committee,
Communication No. R. 2/11, Adoption of Views, ¶¶ 14-16, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/35/40
(Jul. 29, 1980); U.N. Human Rights Comm., Report of the Human Rights Committee, Communication No. R. 8/34,
Adoption of Views, ¶¶ 8-9, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/36/40 (Apr. 8, 1981)).
70
See U.N. Charter art. 39 (citing that “[t]he Security Council shall determine the existence”); see SIMON
CHEST ERMAN, JUST WAR OR JUST PEACE ?: HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 124-25
(2001); see also THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 726 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 2d ed.
2002).
71
RUTH B. RUSSELL, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES 1940-1945
669 (1958).
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authorizing a more general determination of the existence of any threat. Dumbarton was
followed by six and a half weeks of intense diplomatic exchanges culminating in the February
1945 conference at Yalta, and two months later the San Francisco Founding Conference (April
25, 1945 – June 26, 1945). At San Francisco, the “over-nice distinctions,” which more clearly
defined the different phases of a dispute and the particular measures which might apply, were
done away with so that the “provision should be left as broad and flexible as possible.”72 The
“evaluation of circumstances” was to be left entirely to the Council, imparting “wide latitude” of
discretion to the Security Council in determining the existence of a threat to the peace. 73 This
Council volition prompted the United States delegate to remark, “[I]f any single provision of the
Charter has more substance than the others, it is surely this one sentence, in which are
concentrated the most important powers of the Security Council.”74
¶34
Other countries were less comfortable with such Council prerogative, and attempted to
provide a counterbalance by explicitly defining the three states of exception contained in Article
39. Though it was accepted that Chapter VII required a situation of greater gravity than one
“endangering the maintenance of international peace,”75 no further criteria defining and
distinguishing the three Article 39 states of exception were initially put in place. The term
“threat to the peace” has subsequently eluded categorization, while a “breach of the peace” has
come to mean hostilities between armed units. 76 Only an “act of aggression” has been even
partially defined. 77
¶35
From the beginning, the use of the term “aggression” was a point of debate. 78 During the
drafting process, various amendments seeking to make automatic the finding of an act of
aggression, and require subsequent pre-defined responses, were rejected. 79 The Permanent
Members of the Council resisted, arguing that anything constituting an act of aggression could
legitimately be an act of self-defense under Article 51 depending on the circumstances. 80
Therefore, a flexible response was in order.
¶36
The issue was raised again in later sessions of the General Assembly, which—after much
debate and several resolutions postponing a final decision—adopted a definition in 1974. 81 Still,
the years of General Assembly deliberation were in the end ineffectual, as the General Assembly
definition is “neither intended nor able to limit the jurisdiction of the Security Council under
Article 39.”82 While aggression is defined as “the use of armed force by a State against the
sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other
72

Secretary of State, Charter of the United Nations: Report to the President on the Results of the San Francisco
Conference by the Chairman of the United States Delegation, The Secretary of State, 90-91 (Jun. 26, 1945) (Dep’t.
of State Publ. 2349) [hereinafter Report to the President].
73
Id.; RUSSELL, supra note 71, at 670.
74
Report to the President, supra note 72, at 90-91.
75
U.N. Charter arts. 34, 37.
76
THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 70, at 721. In the first 44 years of the UN,
the Council made only three determinations of a “breach of the peace,” in Korea (1950), the Falkland Islands (1982),
and Iran-Iraq (1987). CHESTERMAN (2001), supra note 70, at 114.
77
G.A. Res. 3314 (XXII), Annex arts. 1-4, U.N. Doc. A/9619 (Dec. 14, 1974).
78
The United States argued that it should be subsumed within the “breach of peace” language, while the USSR
countered that it merited distinct mention. RUSSELL, supra note 71, at 464-65.
79
For examp le, Colombia sought to put text in the Charter preamble stating that any “attempt on territorial integrity,
sovereignty, or independence of any state would constitute an act of aggression,” and a Bolivian amendment sought
to require the automatic application of sanctions in response. Id. at 670-73.
80
Id.
81
See G.A. Res. 599 (VI) (Jan. 31, 1952); G.A. Res. 688 (VII) (Dec. 20, 1952); G.A. Res. 3314, supra note 77.
82
THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 70, at 722.
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manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations,” the resolution offers only a partial
list of exemplary situations, and explicitly holds that the Council may consider “other relevant
circumstances” in disregarding the resolution’s articles. 83 Even if this definition were strictly
applied to Article 39, it would not affect those most momentous Council determinations
occurring at the proverbial margins, where precedent ebbs and political discretion flows.
The Council has fiercely guarded—with great success—its birthright of sole and plenary
discretion in such matters. Its permanent members have stood firm against more legalist
conceptions of Article 39, and maintained their province relatively free of encroachment. Where
the primacy of the Council in the maintenance of international peace and security is called into
question, it is most often done so in response to Council inaction, in order to fill a perceived
vacuum where the Council has expressed reticence in the invocation of its Chapter VII powers.
In this respect, the parliamentary check posed by General Assembly action under the Uniting for
Peace resolution, or the organizational substitute offered by regional peace operations, differ
from their domestic analogues.
On multiple occasions, due to the Cold War paralysis of the Security Council, the General
Assembly explicitly referenced Article 39 or utilized language in resolutions pertaining to
specific situations that called for the imposition or strengthening of Chapter VII sanctions. 84
Wary of the possible intrusion into matters reserved specifically for the Council, several
delegations made note that the division of competence between the two organs should be
respected, and that the General Assembly should avoid making any “purported determinations”
of the existence of a threat to peace and security. In discussions over the Question of Palestine,
the Canadian delegation repeatedly stated that the Council “alone” had the mandate—in fact, the
“prerogative”—to determine what constitutes a threat to international peace and security, and
that the Assembly was not the appropriate body for such a discussion. 85
Following the end of the Cold War, the use of Article 39 lexicon in General Assembly
resolutions has been disfavored, and General Assembly resolutions pertaining to matters
exclusively within Council jurisdiction have heeded the earlier- voiced objections and
subsequently refrained from using such terminology. 86 Though the Assembly has been willing to
offer its perspective to rectify the failings of Council inaction, its awareness of exclusive Council
domain over determinations regarding threats to the peace, in addition to the waning and
arguably discredited use of Article 39 determination in Assembly resolutions, further suggest
that the Council possesses a near-sovereign authority to determine international exceptions.
The Secretary-General represents a second influence, if not a “check,” on this authority.
Under the Charter, the Secretary-General is to act as the “chief administrative officer” of the
U.N., and is charged to perform functions entrusted to him by, amongst other organs, the

83

G.A. Res. 3314, supra note 77, Annex arts. 1-4.
See, e.g., G.A. Res. 37/123, ¶¶ 2, 7-8, U.N. Doc. A/RES/37/123 (Dec. 20, 1982); G.A. Res. 36/226, preamble, ¶ 6,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/36/226 (Dec. 17, 1981); G.A. Res. 39/146, ¶¶ 2, 7-8, U.N. Doc. A/RES/ 39/146 (Dec. 14, 1984).
For a more complete list, see Repertory of Practice of the United Nations Organs: Extracts Relating to Article 39 of
the Charter of the United States, Supplement 6 (1979-1984), volume 3, at 17, available at
http://www.untreaty.un.org/cod/ repertory/art39/English/rep_supp6_vol3_art39_e.pdf (last visited Nov. 29, 2007).
85
Id. at ¶ 26 (citing U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., 93d plen. mtg. ¶ 130 (Canada); U.N. GAOR, ES -7, 30th mtg. at 54-55
(Canada)).
86
See, e.g., G.A. Res. 60/40, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/40 (Dec. 1, 2005); G.A. Res 60/41, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/41
(Dec. 1, 2005).
84

37

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS

[2007

Security Council. 87 In this capacity, the Secretary-General has occasionally played a significant
role in influencing Council Article 39 determinations. 88
¶41
The Secretary-General has also acted in matters of international peace and security without
the invitation of the Security Council. Under Article 99, the Secretary-General may “bring to the
attention” of the Council “any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of
international peace and security.”89 Under the stewardship of Trygve Lie, the Secretary-General
established its right to offer unsolicited opinions to the Council, and engage in fact- finding under
its Article 99 discretion. 90 In his first report to the Council on troop deployment in the Congo in
1960, Dag Hamarskjöld went even further, contending that the deteriorating situation in the
country was “a threat to peace and security justifying United Nations intervention.”91 Notably,
this “implied finding” comprised a “main element… from a legal point of view” for the
argument for intervention. 92 The Council had not yet made such a finding, and would not do so
until nine months later, well after the General Assembly had already raised a peacekeeping force.
It might appear that Hamarskjöld effectively usurped the Council’s authority in making this
public, ostensibly objective finding of legal import.
¶42
Ultimately, though, such language proved to be rhetoric lacking legal consequence. In the
face of the Council’s continuing inaction, the General Assembly did not invoke the use of force
based on the Secretary-General’s “finding.”93 Hamarskjöld himself later noted that the license
provided by Article 99 is simply to “engage in informal diplomatic activity in regard to matters
which may threaten international peace and security.”94
¶43
The U.N.’s other organs have little in the way of legally-ordained recourse in checking
Council action under Article 39. As such, the U.N. system is deprived of a useful check
common to emergency systems. The resulting accountability gap suggests the need for
heightened constraints through other channels. Though the Council has demonstrated an
adherence to constitutionalism in its prior practice, its good faith is an inadequate guarantor.
2. Legalism Absent Justiciability
¶44

Amongst the international legal community, it is widely accepted that a Council
determination or inaction under Article 39 (as opposed to the exercise of powers thereafter) is
nonjusticiable. W. Michael Reisman has noted that the term “threat to the peace” has “prove[n]
to be quite elastic in the hands of the Council,” making a judicial review function “somewhat
87

U.N. Charter arts. 97-98.
For instance, in Somalia, Boutros-Ghali’s reports persuaded the Council that an Article 39 determination was in
order given the inadequacy of non-military measures and the “repercussions of the Somali conflict on the entire
region.” U.N. Doc. S/24859 (Nov. 24, 1992); U.N. Doc. S/24868 (Nov. 29, 1992); S.C. Res. 794, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/794 (Dec. 3, 1992).
89
U.N. Charter art. 99 (emphasis added); see also Kofi Annan, Foreword, in SECRETARY OR GENERAL? THE UN
SECRETARY-GENERAL IN W ORLD POLITICS xi (Simon Chesterman ed., 2007).
90
Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/96/Rev.7, at 5 (Dec. 1982); see also Ian
Johnstone, The Role of the UN Secretary-General: The Power of Persuasion Based on Law, 9 Global Governance
441, 443 (2003).
91
U.N. Doc. S/4389 (Jul. 18, 1960) (quoted in FRANCK (1995), supra note 14, at 226-27.)
92
Id.
93
Hamarskjöld’s declaration in fact mentioned the “explicit request” of the Congolese government, suggesting that
it was not any invocation of Chapter VII stemming from his statement, but rather this consent, that was dispositive
in the matter. Id.
94
Dag Hamarskjöld, Lecture at Oxford University (30 May, 1961), in SERVANT OF PEACE : A SELECTION OF THE
SPEECHES AND STATEMENTS OF DAG HAMARSKJÖLD 335 (William Foote ed., 1962).
88

38

Vol. 6:1]

Jared Schott

difficult” in light of the absence of more manageable standards. 95 Legal scholars presume the
Council decision to be a political judgment “not properly suited to judicial examination” and
unanswerable by reference to international law, despite the ubiquitous constraints posed by the
purposes and principles of the organization. 96 The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(ICTR) affirmed this principle in the Kanyabashi case. 97
¶45
Despite these concessions, the Council has not jettisoned its sense of legalism. From the
early consideration of the Franco regime to more recent attempts to characterize internal crises as
international threats, the Council has evinced a juridical perception of its responsibilities and
powers under Article 39. Yet the Council has at times been remiss in its adherence to standards
established by its early practice, and has slowly moved away from those standards. Indeed,
Council action under Article 39 has evolved both procedurally and substantively, shedding
procedural rigor and precision at the expense of clarity and accountability.
i) The Spanish Question
The “primitive” practice of the Council contains evidence of a deliberative body aware of
its unfettered discretion, yet faithful to an approach espousing procedural and substantive
standards. In considering the Spanish Question in April 1946, the Security Council concluded
that a determination under Article 39 constituted a “very sharp instrument” which must “not [be]
blunted or used in any way which would strain the intentions of the Charter or which would not
be applicable in all similar cases.”98 In its seven months of consideration of whether the Franco
regime represented a threat to international peace and security, the Council established several
important principles in operationalizing Article 39. These principles can be summarized as
internationality, viability and immediacy.
¶47
Seeking to sever diplomatic relations with the Franco regime multilaterally, Poland
originally brought the matter to the Council under Article 35 with the support of France, Mexico
and the USSR. 99 In supporting its claim that the regime constituted a threat to the peace, Poland
argued that the threat was not only international (as opposed to “purely domestic”), but also
ongoing and proximate, describing the technological advances and machinery of the Spanish
army as well as its massing military forces near the French border. 100 In so arguing, two
¶46

95

W. Michael Reisman, The Constitutional Crisis in the United Nations, 87 A M. J. INT ’L L. 83, 92 (1993).
See Peter Malanczuk, Reconsidering the Relationship between the ICJ and the Security Council, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE HAGUE’S 750TH A NNIVERSARY 87, 98 (Wybo Heere ed., 1999); see Dapo Akande,
The International Court of Justice and the Security Council: Is There Room for Judicial Control of Decisions of the
Political Organs of the United Nations?, 46 INT ’L & COMP . L.Q. 309, 338 (1997); see DAVID SCHWEIGMAN , THE
A UTHORITY OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL UNDER CHAPTER VII OF THE UN CHARTER: LEGAL LIMITS AND THE ROLE OF
THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 266 (2001).
97
Prosecutor v. Joseph Kanyabashi, Case No. ICTR-96-15-T, Decision on Defense Motion, ¶ 20 (June 18, 1997)
(noting that the Council “has a wide margin of discretion in deciding when and where there exists a threat to
international peace and security,” a matter “not justiciable since [it] involve[s] the consideration of a number of
social, political and circumstantial factors which cannot be weighed and balanced objectively” by a court of law);
see also Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and
Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia) (Prov. Measures), 1993 I.C.J. 439 (1993) (separate opinion of Judge Lauterpacht) (the
Court has no “right…to substitute its discretion for that of the Security Council”).
98
Report of the Sub-Committee on the Spanish Question Appointed by the Security Council on 29 April 1946, U.N.
Doc. S/75 at 11 (¶ 21) (June 1, 1946).
99
To this end, Poland claimed that the fascist government in Spain presented not only a problem “of the past,” but
also a “serious problem of the present” as it continued to “serve the purpose of the Axis” and act as a “centre of
fascist infection.” U.N. SCOR, 1st Ser., 34th mtg. at 159 (1946).
100
Id. at 159, 162.
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substantive criteria implicitly emerged: that the threat be international in nature, and that it exist
at the time of the determination.
¶48
The subsequent deliberations occurred in a litigative fashion, and revealed a keen
awareness of constitutional limitations. Although Poland posed the question in the political
sense—“the problem is…how shall we carry into action this desire…which…we all share?”101 —
the legal nature of the discussion cannot be disregarded. Australia, echoing similar sentiments,
laid out the burden of proof in succinct fashion:
Prima facie, then, this question is one of domestic jurisdiction…First, is it a
matter of international concern and not merely of domestic jurisdiction?
Secondly, is the situation a cause of international friction? If the answer to that
question is affirmative, the following question arises: Thirdly, is it endangering
international peace and security? If the answer to these questions is negative, we
can take no further action. If the answer is affirmative, then, and then only, can
this Council decide what can and should be done. 102
¶49

Further statements by delegations, particularly the lengthy record offered by the USSR,
belie a purely political entity, instead suggesting a very juridical nature to its operations. 103
When China demanded that the threat to the peace would have to be “positively established…
beyond a doubt,”104 it did so not as a political body, but as a Council member wary of the need
for legality and process in determinations under Article 39.
¶50
Despite political support for the Polish draft resolution, the Council hesitated, and instead
chose to “make further studies to determine whether the situation in Spain has led to
international friction and does endanger international peace and security.”105 Only if the
appointed Sub-Committee returned with an affirmative answer would the Council then consider
what “practical measures” to take. In its report, the Sub-Committee found “as a matter of fact”
the fascist nature of the regime, its continued persecution of political opponents, and the
“international friction” caused by its large army and closed border with France.”106 However, it
found no evidence of preparations for aggression, and pointed out that moral condemnation, in
and of itself, could not be equated with a threat to the peace. 107 The Council also found that any
threat that Spain might pose was not immediate. After deciding that recourse to substantial
powers could not be had without the justification of an imminent threat to the international order,
the Council determined that no threat to the peace had been “establish[ed].”108
¶51
In many respects, not making a determination under Article 39 best illuminates the
Council’s constitutional intent. The Council took a legal approach in its deliberations, putting
the burden of persuasion on those arguing for action under Article 39. It referenced substantive
criteria, such as the immediacy and “international” character of the threat, and an “independent
body” investigated the factual record to review the validity and force of the arguments. It also
101

Id. 37th mtg. at 228.
Id. 35th mtg. at 194-96.
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105
S.C. Res 4 (Apr. 29, 1946).
106
Report of the Sub-Committee on the Spanish Question Appointed by the Security Council on 29 April 1946 at 4,
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Id. at 7-10.
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Id. at 12; U.N. SCOR 1st year, 1st ser., No. 2, 44th mtg. at 322 (June 6, 1946).
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utilized a measured procedure in its deliberations, tending towards gradual consideration of an
item, providing offending entities with notice and an opportunity to avoid facing exceptional
Council measures. In its consideration of the Spanish Question, the Council created a promising
mechanism for the accountable and principled determination of a threat to the peace.
ii) Article 39 “Jurisprudence”: Limits and Process
In the years that followed, Article 39 “jurisprudence” moved away from the self- limiting
process first espoused by the Council. The Greek Frontier Incidents Question represents the first
pivotal case in a vaunted history of Council efforts to avoid binding constraints on its Article 39
decision- making power. In discussing the matter, the Council again employed a fact- finding
commission to report on the Greek complaint lodged in December 1946, but following a Soviet
veto, failed to adopt its conclusion that the “support of armed bands” amounted to a threat to the
peace.109 This occurred even though the wording in the resolution was a compromise, with its
sponsor’s emphatic asterisk that the language would not in any way bind the Council in the
future. 110 Such rewording was necessary in light of objections to the originally worded amended
draft resolution, which drew the ire of Council members who felt that it in effect bound them to a
particular definition of “threat to the peace.”111
¶53
The Council continues to avoid limiting its discretion in a calculated fashion, though it
now does so explicitly, most frequently in its resolutions, by highlighting the uniqueness or
particularity of the circumstances. 112 This “ad hocism” prevents the emergence of precedent and
allows the Council to avoid predetermined triggers. Nonetheless, the Council’s awareness of the
precedential value of its words demonstrates its continuing attention to legalism. Indeed, as the
admitted violation of customary law is widely considered the best evidence of the existence of
that law, so too must the Council’s noted awareness of the legal effects of its resolutions suggest
that its political discretion ultimately remains confined to a juridical system.
¶54
The Council response to the Sharpeville Massacre in South Africa provides further
evidence of the “legality” of Article 39. Following the deaths of sixty-nine black protesters,
twenty-nine African and Asian countries together brought the situation before the Council under
Article 35. The preliminary discussion centered on whether the situation constituted a threat to
the peace, echoing prior deliberations in its back-and-forth regarding the domesticity of the
situation and Member State proffers to the contrary. Some Council members argued that the
threat was not in the violent incident that had already taken place, but in the likelihood that
continuing repression of human rights and violence would be met by African nationalism and
violent responses across the continent. 113 The Tunisian representative referred to the “precedent”
set by the Council deliberations during the Spanish Question, noting that ostensibly internal
affairs can amount to a threat to international peace. 114
¶52
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U.N. Doc. S/429 (July 22, 1947).
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Thus, the Council justified its Chapter VII authority in Haiti, Rwanda, Somalia, the Former Republic of
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those countries. See S.C. Res. 841, U.N. Doc. S/RES/841 (June 16, 1993); S.C. Res. 917, U.N. Doc. S/RES/917
(May 6, 1994); S.C. Res. 940, U.N. Doc. S/RES/940 (July 31, 1994); S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25,
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In summary, early Council practice was a mixed bag. It offered glimpses of process and
procedural mechanisms, and established certain very basic substantive criteria. At the same
time, any comprehensive system within the matters involving Article 39 is hard to locate, and
Council aversion to binding criteria has only perpetuated inconsistent practice. Still, the legalism
with which the Council approached Article 39 must be noted. Far from any realist perceptions of
a political sovereign acting outside of the law, Council deliberations and actions depict a salient
appreciation of the legal space in which the Council operated, even as Chapter VII nears and
tangible rules dissipate.

iii) Chinks in the Armor: Growing Incoherence in Council Practice
The concern that political discretion does not beget political fiat also must extend to the
Security Council. The political component of Council action cannot be disputed; the Council
must inevitably take into account the Member States’ willingness and ability to contribute, and it
has acted more vociferously in response to greater political threats. 115 Still, the Council has
approached its task in a juristic fashion, with its Charter- imposed limits in mind. As demands on
the Council have grown, though, more robust Council action alongside more deft political
compromise have led to greater inconsistency and ambiguity in practice. Article 39
determinations made in under-determined form create the potential for the exercise of power by
Council fiat, mirroring the slippery slope that many countries facing “permanent emergencies”
have fallen down. As the Council faces threats “of a kind, or an order of magnitude, entirely
different from those envisaged by the Charter’s authors,”116 the “living” Charter must adapt as
well.
¶57
The Council has long resisted endorsing binding criteria of any potency. This has stunted
the uniformity of its practice, preventing both the development of objective triggers for invoking
Article 39 and the categorical exclusion of specific situations from Article 39 qualification.
Were such minimal objective triggers in place, the Council would have had difficulty finding
that regime changes in Haiti117 and Sierra Leone 118 constituted threats to the peace. This lack of
consistent binding criteria has also led the Council to make Article 39 determinations that fail to
conform to the principle that threats to international peace and security must be proximate, if no t
immediate. 119 For example, the Council has made Article 39 determinations in seemingly
retroactive fashion, as in the case of Libyan non-compliance with American and British requests
for extradition of the suspected Pan-Am Flight 103 bombers. 120
¶56
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CHESTERMAN (2001), supra note 70, at 153 (remarking on the Council response to the “political threat” posed by
the Haitian crisis in 1993).
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597, 601 (2006).
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S.C. Res. 841, U.N. Doc. S/RES/841 (June 16, 1993); S.C. Res. 917, U.N. Doc. S/RES/917 (May 6, 1994); S.C.
Res. 940, U.N. Doc. S/RES/940 (July 31, 1994).
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See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1132, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1132 (Oct. 8, 1997); S.C. Res. 1270, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1270 (Oct. 22,
1999); S.C. Res. 1289, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1289 (Feb. 7, 2000).
119
Bernhard Graefrath, Leave to the Court What Belongs to the Court: The Libyan Case, 4 EUR . J. INT ’L L. 184, 196
(1993) (“It remains absolutely unclear why or how the failure to renunciate terrorism … or the failure to surrender
suspects, or the refusal of compensation claims which are not established under any legal procedure, could constitute
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120
Some academics, however, would champion certain Article 39 determinations that did not involve immediate
threats. They propose that the Council adopt prospective criteria mandating an Article 39 determination. Of note is
the acclaimed doctrine put forward by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS)
in The Responsibility to Protect (R2P). Noted by former Secretary-General Kofi Annan with approval, R2P put
forward several thresholds of “just cause” including the large scale loss of human life and large scale ethnic
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¶58

More ala rming Council positions are those that arise simply out of “diplomatic
carelessness.” Consider, for instance, the reasoning behind Article 39 determinations offered in
Council resolutions. Within domestic emergency systems, a common validating measure has
been a notification regimen requiring justification given at both the international, and sometimes
domestic, level. The Council, however, has not adopted this principle with any semblance of
exactitude. Admittedly, some resolutions do more than others. In Resolution 1521 concerning
Liberia, the Council went out of its way to determine that beyond the mere “situation,” “the
proliferation of arms and armed non-State actors, including mercenaries, in the sub-region
continue[s] to constitute a threat to international peace and security in West Africa, in particular
to the peace process in Liberia.”121 In other resolutions, however, such as those establishing the
United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB) and the U.N. Operation in Côte d’Ivoire
(UNOCI), the Council has, following wide-ranging and unfocused preambles, quite laconically
“determine[ed]” or “not[ed]” that the country “situation” constitutes a threat to international
peace and security. 122 This imprecision not only hinders the appropriate confinement of Chapter
VII authority, but also indicates larger transparency deficits in Council practice.
¶59
Despite a slant in the Council’s Provisional Rules of Procedure towards publicity and
transparency, 123 in recent years resolutions invoking Article 39 and Chapter VII more generally
have been constructed outside of public purview in informal consultations, with formal meetings
acting as “mere ceremonial events, typically of very short duration.”124 W. Michael Reisman has
referred to this phenomenon as a “parliame ntary matryoshka (doll),” containing “ever-smaller
‘mini-Councils,’ each meeting behind closed doors without keeping records, and each taking
decisions secretly.”125 Such opacity only amplifies the disquietude caused by textually
unreasoned Article 39 determinations.
¶60
The synergy of this “opacity effect” extends to the imprecise and inconsistent Article 39
terminology employed by the Council in its resolutions. In many cases, the Council utilizes the
vernacular of Article 39 without explicit reference to Chapter VII. In such cases, a threat to the
peace is determined, but it is unclear whether it has the legal effect of an Article 39
determination. For instance, the Council has, without reference to Chapter VII, expressed grave
concern towards the situation in the Cyprus which “has led to a serious threat to international
peace and security, 126 as well as the situation in the Congo which “seriously imperil[s] peace and
order…of the Congo, and threaten[s] international peace and security.”127
cleansing. Though the restrictive nature of such malleable terms is limited absent further refinement, to some R2P
poses the threat of binding Article 39 triggers; to others, it represents further license to take an expansive notion of
Article 39 and in so doing disregard Article 2(7). In 2006, the Council for the first time endorsed the R2P standards,
“reaffirming” paragraphs 138 and 139 of the World Summit Outcome Document which covered the topic, and later
referenced this responsibility to protect (i.e., resolution 1674) in a Chapter VII resolution regarding Sudan. Whether
R2P can be integrated into Council practice in a prospective fashion, or continues as a mere post hoc rationalization,
remains to be seen. International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect,
(2001), http://www.iciss.ca/pdf/Commission-Report.pdf.; S.C. Res. 1674, ¶4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1674 (Apr. 28,
2006); S.C. Res. 1706, ¶2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1706 (Aug. 31, 2006).
121
S.C. Res. 1521. U.N. Doc. S/RES/1521 (Dec. 21, 2003).
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See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1545, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1545 (May 21, 2004); see also S.C. Res. 1528, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1528 (Feb. 27, 2004).
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James O.C. Jonah, Differing State Perspectives on the United Nations in the Post-Cold War Perspective, ACUNS
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Reisman, supra note 95, at 85-86.
126
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¶61

Conversely, the Council has also acted under Chapter VII without any reference to Article
39, or threats to international peace and security. Under Resolutions 1422 and 1487 granting
peace operations personnel immunity from International Criminal Court (ICC) prosecution, the
Council in the preambular paragraphs of the resolutions simply states that “it is in the interests of
international peace and security to facilitate Member States’ ability to contribute” to U.N. peace
operations. 128 As discussed in later Sections, these resolutions illustrate a blurring of the lines
between normalcy and exception similar to that witnessed in domestic emergency systems, as the
Council uses exceptional powers to legislate in non-exceptional circumstances and bypasses
legitimating constitutional mechanisms.
¶62
The differences in language are not a simple matter of semantics. Resolution 660
following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait included not only an explicit determination, but also
specifically referenced Article 39 (as well as Article 40) as the basis for its actions. 129 Less than
one year later, Resolution 688 noted that the flow of refugees across international borders
threatened international peace and security, but omitted reference to Chapter VII. 130 Thus, it was
unclear whether or not the “safe zones” established thereafter to allow for humanitarian access
were legitimately created under the Council’s exceptional powers. Similarly, when Resolution
447 was passed to condemn South Africa’s sustained armed invasions of Angola launched from
“illegally occupied” Namibia, it remained unclear whether in fact the resolution was adopted
under Chapter VII. 131
¶63
This problem emerges not only in the construction of the Article 39 determination, but also
in its application to the operative paragraphs of the resolution. Article 39 determinations, and the
subsequent “Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter…” tagline, are too often applied by the
Council in blanket and under-determined form. When this occurs, the scope of the Chapter VII
state of exception becomes unclear, and principles of proportionality and necessity are called into
question.
¶64
In rare instances, the Council makes a concerted effort to draft a clear and refined
resolution under Chapter VII. 132 The Council has also specified its Chapter VII powers by
compartmentalizing resolutions, dividing them broadly into a Chapter VI section and a Chapter
VII section. 133 More commonly, Article 39 determinations and subsequent Chapter VII
128
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130
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S/RES/814 (March 26, 1993) (addressing humanitarian issues in Part A, and issues relating to the use of force in
Part B).

44

Vol. 6:1]

Jared Schott

authorizations are applied in blanket fashion to broad mandates. In Resolution 1545 regarding
ONUB, only the preamble referenced Chapter VII explicitly, but paragraph 5 authorized ONUB
to use “all necessary means” to carry out an incredibly broad mandate, including activities
ranging from disarmament to civilian protection to elections. In so doing, it did not specify
whether Chapter VII was applicable only to those “usual suspects” involving force, or if it
similarly applied to the operation’s peacebuilding functions. The Council similarly offered a
vague Chapter VII authorization for the unprecedented transitional administrations in Kosovo
and East Timor. Under Resolution 1272, the United Nations Transitional Administration in East
Timor (UNTAET) was established under a broad, unreasoned preambular Chapter VII
authorization. 134 In Kosovo, Resolution 1244, adopted under Chapter VII, proceeded without
further refinement to describe both a military and civilian component to the multilateral
intervention, under different flags (NATO and the UN) and with sharply divergent tasks. No
guidance was offered in ascertaining how and to which functions Chapter VII would apply. 135
Such directives erode the boundary between Chapters VI and VII.
E. Blurring the Lines
1. Domestically
¶65

As governments disregard the rationale behind exception and opportunistically resort to
emergency powers instead of the regular channels of action conforming to more exacting liberal
standards, the distinction between emergency and regular governance is obscured. Where this
occurs and procedural mechanisms become mere formalities, states of emergency become
permanent and little more than an excuse to forgo the niceties of constitutional checks on
governmental action. Distinct governmental allocations of jurisdiction are encroached upon, and
the legislative process is devitalized. More often than not, the “insidious outcome” of this
situation “is the tendency to slide into a new conception of normality that takes vastly extended
controls for granted, and thinks of freedom in smaller and smaller dimensions.”136
¶66
The erosion of boundaries transpires in several interconnected ways. Emergencies can
become entrenched in a temporal sense, as renewal and extension mechanisms are often less
procedurally rigorous, both de jure and de facto. Egypt, for example, has been under emergency
rule since 1958 under Emergency Law No. 162.137 In Swaziland, a state of emergency has
persisted for over thirty years; in Malaysia, for thirty-seven, and in Syria, over forty. 138 Limiting
mechanisms have often proven ineffective in the face of executive will. In Malaysia, a
134
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See John Daniel, Countries at the Crossroads 2005,Country Report: Swaziland, FREEDOM HOUSE ,
http://www.freedomhouse.org/modules/publications/ccr/modPrintVersion.cfm?edition=2&ccrpage=8&ccrcountry=9
8 (last visited March 22, 2007); David Lesch, Countries at the Crossroads 2005, Country Report: Syria, FREEDOM
HOUSE ,
HTTP ://www.freedomhouse.org/modules/publications/ccr/modPrintVersion.cfm?edition=2&ccrpage=8&ccrcountry=
106 (last visited Feb. 21, 2007); Sahr Muhammed Ally, Convicted Before trial: Indefinite Detention under
Malaysia’s Emergency Ordinance, http://hrw.org/reports/2006/malaysia0806/index.htm(last visited March 22,
2007).

45

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS

[2007

government-appointed Royal Commission stated in 2005 that the emergency law “ha[d] outlived
its purpose” and was continuing simply to “[facilitate] the abuse of fundamental liberties.”139
Still, no change has occurred, as the Malaysian constitution bars judicial review of proclamations
of emergency and their continuation. 140 Elsewhere, though judicial review is nominally
available, scrutiny of the duration of emergency has been a rarity, with courts instead “regarding
each derogation case as a singular exception.”141 Insulated and objective judicial review has not
been replaced by political willpower.
¶67
The invocation of emergency in the face of less-than-dire circumstances has also confused
its boundaries. The notion of emergency has spread from an initially security-oriented concept
to an economic one, devaluing the term. It is the task of the law to ensure that the exceptional
powers of emergency do not become a means by which authorities attempt to cut corners of
governance. Chapter VII presents a similar challenge.
2. When, to What, and Where Does an Article 39 Determination Apply?
¶68

The normalization and expansion of exception can be seen on the international plane as
well. Chapter VII has kept pace with, if not outpaced, the general increase in Council action
across the board. In the first forty-four years of the Council’s existence, “[twenty- four] Security
Council resolutions cited or used the terms of Chapter VII; by 1993 it was adopting that many
such resolutions every year.”142 In 2005 this number rose to thirty-nine. In 2006, no fewer than
forty-two Council resolutions cited Chapter VII.
¶69
Such expansion has increasingly blurred the lines between the traditional pacific dispute
settlement functions of Chapter VI and the enforcement actions of Chapter VII, euphemistically
captured in the term “Chapter Six and a Half.”143 While during the Cold War a sharp line was
drawn between traditional peacekeeping under Chapter VI and enforcement action under Chapter
VII, the nature and complexity of post-Cold War peace operations has often required a hybrid
form of peace enforcement, despite Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s recognition that
“to blur the distinction between the two can undermine the viability of the peace-keeping
operation and endanger its personnel.”144 Boutros-Ghali did attempt to reinforce the distinction
and depict the Chapters as “alternative techniques and not as adjacent points on a continuum,”145
but that attempt was undermined by the Brahimi Report, which suggested the distinction between
the two was misleading and emphasized the need “to project credible force.”146 Where the
terminology of Article 39 and Chapter VII is interchangeably used and omitted from resolutions,
the U.N. extracts its arguable deterrent effect at the expense of constitutional validity.
¶70
Moreover, inconsistent language in drafting leaves even Council members wondering
whether Chapter VII has actually been invoked. In 1992, China abstained from voting for
139
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Resolution 776, which sought to provide the U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR) with the
capacity to secure the delivery of humanitarian aid. Though no explicit language appeared,
China, preferring a traditional Chapter VI peacekeeping mission, believed that the resolution
implicitly invoked Chapter VII through its reference back to the prior Chapter VII Resolution
770.147 Where uncertainty ascends to the highest veto- holding Council members, the resolutions
surely cannot be said to conform to the principle of notice central to emergency systems.
¶71
Mandate resolutions are especially prone to inconsistent drafting. Though some
resolutions clarify the contours of the situation—for instance, by enumerating and affirming
prior resolutions “except as expressly changed” within the resolution in question148 —many
resolutions, particularly relating to mandate evolution, fail in this respect. Missions go through
several iterations of title, command structure and authorization, ostensibly reflecting the evolving
situation on the ground. While resolutio ns authorizing a new mandate theoretically serve to
tailor response measures so that they remain proportional to and necessary in light of the relevant
threat, often such resolutions do not properly signal the cessation of Chapter VII status; they
thereby create a situation in which mandate evolution does more to obscure the status of
operations than to define it. The inconsistency and ambiguity of “re-hatting” resolutions in
restating the applicability of Chapter VII raises the question of whether such authorizations
continue on or are eventually annulled tacitly, subject to revocation by some form of desuetude.
Though the threat of the “reverse veto,” blocking the termination of a Chapter VII
authorization, 149 has impacted this practice considerably, it cannot explain the capricious, if not
incoherent, way in which the Council has denoted an operation’s level of authorization.
¶72
As an example, Resolution 1706, expanding the U.N. Mission in Sudan (UNMIS),
explicitly restates the Article 39 determination and its Chapter VII authorization, while
relegating the latter to a subset of the mandate. 150 Similarly, in Côte d’Ivoire, the resolution
establishing the U.N. operation (UNOCI) and allocating authority between it and existing French
and ECOWAS forces restates the Chapter VII invocation. It also expressly limits, for a matter of
months, the force authorization given to these partners. 151 In contrast, resolutions regarding UN
activities in Sierra Leone do not maintain consistent authorization language. After one resolution
explicitly invoked Chapter VII authority in revising the mandate of the UNAMSIL mission in
Sierra Leone, later resolutions extending the UNAMSIL mandate made no mention of Chapter
VII until its final extension. 152 At the same time, resolutions pertaining to the Special Court in
Sierra Leone and conflict diamonds included an explicit Chapter VII authorization, raising the
question of Chapter VII’s continuing applicability to the broad UNAMSIL mandate. 153
147

S.C. Res. 776, U.N. Doc. S/RES/776 (Sept. 14, 1992); see also CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
U SE OF FORCE 218 (2d ed., 2004).
148
See, e.g., S.C. Res. 687, ¶1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (Apr. 3, 1991).
149
David Caron, The Legitimacy of the Collective Authority of the Security Council, 87 A M. J. INT ’L L. 552, 577
(1993).
150
S.C. Res. 1706, ¶12, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1706 (Aug. 31, 2006); see also S.C. Res 1590, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1590
(Mar. 24, 2005) (establishing UNMIS).
151
S.C. Res. 1528, ¶8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1528 (Feb. 27, 2004); see also S.C. Res. 1464, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1464
(Feb. 4, 2003) (authorizing ECOWAS and French forces under Chapter VII to “take the necessary steps to
guarantee” security and freedom of movement for their forces and civilians).
152
S.C. Res. 1270, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1270 (Oct. 22, 1999) (establishing UNAMSIL); S.C. Res. 1289, ¶10, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1289 (Feb. 7, 2000) (modifying mandate); S.C. Res. 1306, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1306 (July 5, 2000)
(extending mandate with no Chapter VII reference); see also S.C. Res. 1334, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1334 (Dec. 22,
2000); S.C. Res. 1346, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1346 (March 30, 2001); S.C. Res 1400, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1400 (March 28,
2002).
153
See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1385, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1385 (Dec. 19, 2001) (Chapter VII resolution on conflict diamonds);
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¶73

Whether the status of a resolution can be determined solely by explicit reference to Chapter
VII, or if reference back to prior Chapter VII resolutions suffices, is a contested point. This
opacity in practice, in turn, leaves actors with little certainty as to whether Chapter VII is still in
force. Such uncertainty creates room for the unnecessary extension of Chapter VII authority,
which, in light of the normative exceptionalism it engenders and the prima facie legitimacy it
endows (discussed further in following Sections), can facilitate unaccountable and illegitimate
action on behalf of the Council and Council-authorized actors. This is particularly the case as
peace operations trend towards longer tenures with enduring authorizations that recognize the
propensity of post-conflict regions to relapse. 154
¶74
Carelessness in this respect can provide actors with a specious legal argument for later
action under Chapter VII, as was the case in Iraq. Following the Iraqi acceptance of ceasefire
terms after the “Gulf War,” the Council invoked Chapter VII in Resolution 687, declaring the
ceasefire effective while extending sanctions and establishing a body to supervise the destruction
of proscribed weapons (UNSCOM).155 As discontent with Iraqi compliance reached a tipping
point over ten years later, the Council passed Resolution 1441 under Chapter VII, referencing the
earlier resolutions in a manner suggestive of an ongoing and continuous Chapter VII
authorization and deciding that Iraq remained in “material breach” of its obligations, primarily
under Resolution 687. 156 In light of Council practice, the question of whether the invocation of
Chapter VII, or the authorization to use force there under, had become entrenched is uncertain. 157
The matter remained on the Council agenda under the same title through 2005, and intervening
resolutions invoked Chapter VII referencing their relation to earlier Chapter VII resolutions,
particularly 687. 158 Absent clearer and more consistent practice, the lingering import of Chapter
VII in the situation is at best uncertain.
¶75
The case of Iraq demonstrates the very real dangers inherent in the Council’s calculated
negligence. Without clearer temporal limits to the invocation of Chapter VII, as well as
predictable (if not legally operative) practice, the resulting uncertainty can transcend the realm of
semantics. In Iraq, it led to the loss of Council control, and provided the legal foundation
necessary to galvanize a “Coalition of the Willing.”
¶76
A cursory glance at the Council agenda further emphasizes the tendency towards
entrenc hment of situations in which Chapter VII has been invoked. In remaining actively seized
of a matter, the Council can stay apprised of a situation and act quickly when necessary; it can
also prevent the General Assembly from acting on the matter. 159 This logic is analogous to that of
the domestic emergency, wherein the emergency is prolonged to centralize authority in the acting
body, typically the executive. Though the Council has explicitly “concluded its consideration”
of an item and removed it from the list of matters of which the Council is seized, 160 it has done so
infrequently, and matters have remained on the Council’s agenda for extended periods of time. 161
S.C. Res. 1315, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1315 (Aug. 14, 2000) (Chapter VII resolution pertaining to the Special Court).
154
Roughly half of all countries emerging from conflict relapse into violence within five years. See United Nations
Department of Public Information, 2005 World Summit: Securing a Dangerous World, available at
http://www.un.org/summit2005/presskit/Peace.pdf.
155
S.C. Res. 687, U.N. Doc. S/REC/687 (Apr. 3, 1991).
156
S.C. Res. 1441, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1441 (Nov. 8, 2002).
157
S.C. Res. 687, supra note 157, ¶ 34 (concluding the Council would “remain seized” of the matter and take
“further steps” to “secure peace and security in the region”).
158
See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1154, ¶¶3-4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1154 (Mar. 2, 1998); S.C. Res. 1284, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1284
(Dec. 17, 1999).
159
U.N. Charter art. 11; Certain Expenses, supra note 116, at 176-77.
160
S.C. Res. 1506 ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1506 (Sept. 12, 2003) (concluding consideration of the Libyan situation,
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Perhaps with an eye towards eliminating such agenda stalwarts, the current working
methods of the Council provide for the “automatic” deletion of matters from the agenda which
have not been considered in the preceding five years, unless a Council member contests the
deletion—in which case the matter must be renewed annually. 162 A period of five years, though,
is a nontrivial amount of time. What is more, the rule does not address the Council’s injudicious
use of nomenclature. Though Kuwait was quickly liberated from the Iraqi invasion in 1991 and
largely irrelevant to later arms control issues, the Council continued to consider developments in
Iraq under the general title “the situation between Iraq and Kuwait” until 2005, when it finally
held informal consultations addressing the obsolete title. 163 Such negligence contributes to the
lack of clarity in assessing both the purpose and endpoint of Council responses to threats to the
peace, and allows for the routinization of exception.
F. Apportioning Limits

¶78

Six decades of work has demonstrated that the Council will not be defined by its political
nature. Through its words and actions, it is evident that the Council acts in a juridical fashion,
particularly when contemplating the determination of a threat to international peace and security.
Still, by themselves the textual limits of the Charter have failed to ensure the valid invocation of
Chapter VII. Discordant Council practice has resulted in a blurring of the lines between the
ordinary powers and functions allotted to the Council and those extraordinary powers reserved
for situations constituting, at a minimum, threats to international peace and security. The failure
to use established criteria, the blanket and under-determined form in which Chapter VII is
invoked, and the lack of transparency all cast doubt on whether contemporary Council
resolutions provide a valid and constitutional basis for derogations from the ordinary.
¶79
In pursuing the ideals of exception, domestic experience offers several insights. The first
advises against constructing a series of bulwarks to address the problem. Political discretion is
an integral component of the decision to enter into a state of exception. Because of this, explicit
substantive rules are rare in constitutional and statutory schemes, and judicial oversight has been
deferential, with judges loathe to substitute their policy wisdom for that of the declaratory
authority’s in the absence of more manageable standards.
¶80
The domestic experience has shown that procedural limits on declaration are the more
effective tool, acting as secondary rules to enforce higher constitutional standards. With respect
to constitutionalizing the unsound practice of the Council, several such checks stand out as
potentially valuable safeguards. The first is the need for the Council to provide actual notice of
Article 39 determinations, and develop a factual record supporting those determinations in a
manner inspired by the reporting requirements of the major international human rights
instruments’ derogation clauses. Determinations are now largely influenced or made within the
closed confines of Council caucus meetings, and resolutions frequently fail to provide the
dating back to Dec. 1991). See also S.C. Res. 10 U.N. Doc. S/RES/10 (Nov. 4, 1946) (taking the Spanish Question
off of the Council’s list).
161
SYDNEY D. BAILEY , THE PROCEDURE OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL 351 (1975) (listing several outdated
matters).
162
President of the Security Council, Handbook on the Working Methods of the Security Council ¶50 (Dec. 2006),
annexed to U.N. Doc. S/2006/507 (July 19, 2006).
163
The Council decided that “the situation between Iraq and Kuwait” would apply to issues relating to the return of
Kuwaiti property, repatriation/return of Kuwaiti and third -country nationals (and their remains), and the U.N.
Compensation Commission. Other issues would be considered under the agenda item “The situation concerning
Iraq.” President of the Security Council, Note, U.N. S/2005/251 (Apr. 18, 2005).
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reasoning behind an Article 39 determination. This occurs despite the more thorough precedent
set by the Council in its consideration of the Spanish Question, providing both a lengthy,
publicly available deliberation of the issue, as well as a record in the form of the appointed SubCommittee’s report. Full employment of the Council’s fact- finding powers under Article 34
through the established use of commissions of inquiry before an Article 39 determination is
made would satisfy these principles. These commissions would provide an objective assessment
of the situation, and additionally allow the Council to proffer a factual record for its decision.
The greater use of commissions would also answer a pivotal question of institutional
competence: how the Council can wield such discretion without an independent intelligence
capacity. Use of these independent commissions would, at least on an ad hoc basis, ensure
accountable and objective factual bases for Council deliberation.
The domestic experience in emergency also highlights the essential role clarity and
transparency play in guaranteeing accountable action. Perhaps the most significant procedural
reform that may be gleaned from that experience is the consistent use of language regarding
threats to, and breaches of, international peace and security. With the normative implications of
“Chapter Six and a half” now long established, calculated ambiguity no longer serves a purpose
as applied to the terms of Article 39. The vagaries of diplomatic compromise should not
encroach on what is ultimately a binary decision—Chapter Six or Chapter Seven—but rather, if
unavoidable, should be confined to the mandate proper.
Clarity here is a multi- faceted proposition involving several changes. The lexicon of
Article 39 should be standardized, through resolution, Presidential Statement or amendment to
the Rules of Procedure. To be of legal effect, Article 39 determinations would ha ve to explicitly
reference either a threat to international peace and security, a breach thereof, or an act of
aggression. Any linguistic mimicry, such as “friction,” “endangers” or “continuance in time,”
would have no legal effect, but could still prove useful in creating a gradual system of notice. To
further elucidate Council intent, resolutions should also specifically describe in a concise
preambular statement the reasoning behind the Article 39 determination. Further, the relevant
body paragraphs of a resolution should explicitly invoke Chapter VII authorization and specify
the provisions it applies to as well as the territorial or temporal limits to be observed. These
standardized practices would not infringe on the discretion of the Council, whic h would still be
able to craft broad authorizations and powers. Confinement to uniform terminology of legal
effect would, however, highlight Council intentions and clarify the legal impact of resolutions,
thereby augmenting the transparency and accountability of Council decisions.
Clarity and consistency are similarly essential in resolutions pertaining to mandate
evolution and termination. Necessity and proportionality demand that the Council dynamically
tailor its response to a situation as it unfolds to prevent Chapter VII from becoming a permanent
fixture. While there is certainly an incentive to lessen the length of operations in light of the
paucity of resources at the macro- level, once an operation is established the operational
flexibility and authority provided by Chapter VII authority has a “narcotic effect.”
Recent Council experience with “smart sanctions” provides a model for clearer and more
narrowly tailored practice. Arising as a result of criticisms of the collateral damage to
populations of targeted countries, attentive consideration of the problem has resulted in sanctions
designed “in accordance with strict and objective criteria,” including “time frames, clear and
precise objectives, accountability, periodic review and timely and objective assessment of the

50

Vol. 6:1]

Jared Schott

effects of sanctions.”164 In addition to developing more narrowly tailored sanctions, the Council
has affirmatively terminated or suspended sanctions measures using explicit language. 165
¶85
Involvement of the Secretary-General as an “objective trigger” for termination represents a
second means through which to rein in Council discretion and limit the invocation of Chapter
VII. This approach has been previously used in both sanctions measures and peace operations. 166
In utilizing an objective trigger in a manner consistent with the Charter, the Council would avoid
the intransigence and entrenchment associated with the threat of the reverse veto. Such triggers
would not only bind the Council to a pre-determined limit, but place the decision- making
authority in an independent, objective and (ostensibly) politically- insulated body. Moreover,
increased use of objective and independent triggers could provide bright- line endpoints, both
with respect to the termination of Chapter VII measures as well as the invocation more generally.
¶86
Finally, the Council’s past successes in drafting clear and compartmentalized mandates
could serve as templates for future drafting. One such mandate endowed MONUC, operating in
a complex environment, with a Chapter VII authorization in 2003. 167 The mission had the typical
blanket Chapter VII authority for the entire mandate, but under paragraphs 25 and 26 of the
resolution, was endowed with full enforcement power in the region of Ituri, and more limited
enforcement power “within its capabilities” in North and South Kivu, as well as for the
protection of civilians. 168 Resolution 1493 therefore presents a prime example of the ability of
the Council to narrowly tailor a mandate to ensure the proportionality of its force authorizations
through territorial limits.
¶87
The Council has also specified its Chapter VII powers by compartmentalizing resolutions,
dividing them broadly into a Chapter VI section and a Chapter VII section. Thus, in Resolution
918 regarding the situatio n in Rwanda, part “A” referred to the expansion of the U.N. Assistance
Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) without a Chapter VII authorization, while part “B” included an
Article 39 determination in calling for the imposition of an arms embargo. 169 In Resolution 814
addressing humanitarian issues and mandate expansion in Somalia, part “A” once more outlined

164

Report of the Special Committee on the Charter of the United Nations and on the Strengthening of the Role of the
Organization ¶23, U.N. Doc. A/61/33 (supp.) (Jan. 1, 2006). See also President of the Security Council, Statement
by the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2006/28 (June 22, 2006).
165
See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1074 ¶2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1074 (Oct. 1, 1996). In lifting the sanctions against Libya arising
from the Lockerbie incident, Resolution 1506 first recounted the steps taken to ostensibly eliminate the threat to the
peace and subsequently enumerated the specific measures to be terminated “with immediate effect.” It also
explicitly dissolved the related sanctions committee and “concluded its consideration of the item,” thereby
“remov[ing] [it] from the list of matters of which the Council is seized.” S.C. Res. 1506, supra note 160, ¶¶ 1-3.
166
An arms embargo against Eritrea and Ethiopia included both a sunset clause and a termination trigger should the
Secretary-General report that a “peaceful definitive settlement of the conflict has been concluded.” S.C. Res. 1298
¶¶16-17, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1298 (May 17, 2000). In Haiti, embargo provisions would come into effect at a predetermined time unless the Secretary-General reported that their imposition was “not warranted” in light of
negotiations; the measures would be lifted upon the Secretary-General finding that “the de facto authorities in Haiti
have signed and have begun implementing in good faith an agreement to reinstate the legitimate government.” S.C.
Res. 841, ¶¶3, 16, U.N. Doc. S/RES/841 (June 16, 1993). The French operation in Rwanda, Opération Turquoise,
was also authorized for a limited period of time (two months), but this authorization could be terminated earlier if
the Secretary-General determined that the expanded UNAMIR operation was “able to carry out its mandate.” S.C.
Res. 929, ¶4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/929 (Jun. 22, 1994).
167
S.C. Res. 1493, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1493 (Jul. 28, 2003).
168
Id. at ¶¶25-27; Annual Review 2006, supra note 132, at 75.
169
S.C. Res. 918, U.N. Doc. S/RES/918 (May 17, 1994). See also S.C. Res. 1564 (June 1, 204) (applying Chapter
VII only to that part of the MINUSTAH mandate covered in ¶7).
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humanitarian measures to which the Article 39 determination would not apply, while part “B”
expounded on issues relating to the use of force and mandate expansio n. 170
¶88
The domestic experience provides one further procedural mechanism of note—intragovernmental checks. In such systems, where the powers to both declare an emergency and act
during it reside in the same entity, typically the executive, a secondary power is entrusted to the
parliamentary body to ratify, reject or extend the declaration. Within the U.N., the General
Assembly has a recognized residual power in matters of international peace and security, but it
cannot make determinations of legal effect, nor can it act at all if the Council is seized of a
matter. Ratification of Article 39 determinations and the invocation of Chapter VII by a majority
of the General Assembly would not unduly delay Council action. It would, however, legitimate
Council decisions through “democratic” process, and give voice to Troop Contributing Countries
that make Chapter VII operations possible. 171 It would also provide a substitute for review by
requiring the Council to draft clearer resolutions, under threat of rejection. To be fully
enforceable, the new practice would likely require an amendment to the Charter—perhaps, as a
compromise, in lieu of Council membership reform—but revision of rules of procedure and
subsequent practice could institutionalize the mechanism, at least informally.
¶89
Investigation of Article 39 is, ultimately, just a small portion of the equation. Council
exercise of Chapter VII powers, and the concrete manifestation of those powers in Councilauthorized action, not only impact the constitutional framework of the organization, but also
directly relate to the phenomenon of legal derogations. Not surprisingly, the same issues of
justiciability and limits emerge again in both of these areas.
III. THE BOUNDS OF COUNCIL POWER
¶90

The inexhaustive language of the Charter has prompted some to contend that the freedom
of the Council “to decide when to apply coercive measures is matched by an equal discretion as
to what measures may be taken.”172 Following an Article 39 determination, Article 41 permits
the Council to move beyond provisional measures and “effect its decisions” through “measures
not involving the use of armed force,” including but not limited to the “complete or partial
interruption” of economic and diplomatic relations. 173 If such measures are deemed
“inadequate,” Article 42 grants the Council the authority to take action by “air, sea or land
forces” and again offers an inexhaustive list of such operations. 174 The binding effect of Council
decisions and the thrust of its powers are cemented in Articles 25 and 49, which assure that
Member States “agree and accept to carry out the decisions of the Council” and “shall join in
affording mutual assistance in carrying out the measures” decided upon. 175
¶91
Guidance from the Charter in defining the nature of and constraints on Chapter VII
authority is imprecise and in many ways lacking. Offering few finite enumerations or rules, it
establishes a system of exceptions and corresponding powers that suggests—but does not
170

S.C. Res. 814, U.N. Doc. S/RES/814 (Mar. 26, 1993).
Operational enhancements may help in reducing the arbitrary impact of politics on Council action. The soon-tobe operational Standing Police Capacity initiative, and the more theoretical Rapid Reaction Force, would allow for
Article 39 determinations and corresponding mandates to be developed in a more “ideal” sense, without having to
compromise to account for commitment gaps.
172
Grayson Kirk, The Enforcement of Security, 55 YALE L.J. 1081, 1089 (1946).
173
U.N. Charter arts. 40, 41.
174
Id. at art. 42.
175
Id. at arts. 25, 49.
171
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dictate—that Chapter VII power, though broad, is often met by countervailing considerations
that may limit its exercise. When Chapter VII is conceptualized by reference to the regulative
ideals of emergency, these considerations are underscored, and the corresponding limits distilled.
Before exploring these limits, however, it is worthwhile to investigate what the Council can do,
as opposed to what it cannot.
A. The Power Afforded by Chapter VII…
1. To Validly Derogate
¶92

As in the context of emergency, Chapter VII power is important not simply for its
affirmative grant of positive powers, but also for the provided legal (as opposed to moral)
authority to validly derogate from deep-seated provisions of international law. Foremost under
Chapter VII is the Council’s authority to enforce its decisions through the use of force,
suspending the application of Article 2(4)’s fundamental prohibition. A prohibition on the threat
or use of force is generally accepted to be not merely treaty nor customary law, but a peremptory
norm having the character of jus cogens. 176 Yet, the Charter has established a system providing
for its temporary suspension vis-à-vis the Security Council during certain states of exception.
This authority has not solely rested with the Council, but has been extended to authorized actors
through Council delegation. 177 Thus, the Charter carves out a powerful foundation for concrete
Council action, as well as a truly exceptional power in its own right.
¶93
The invocation of Chapter VII also entails an exception to Article 2(7). 178 Here, however,
the Council is not temporarily derogating from the norm of non- intervention in domestic affairs;
Article 2(7) remains in force throughout. In declaring a situation an act of aggression, a threat to
or a breach of international peace, a determination under Article 39 inherently adjudicates the
matter to be non-domestic in nature and within the purview of Council jurisdiction. 179 Still, the
power to decide on the applicability of Article 2(7) is an exceptional and controversial
prerogative. For Member States, Article 2(7) represents a codified safeguard of the venerable,
albeit timeworn, concept of sovereignty in its full Westphalian regalia, protecting the exclusive
control by a State of its territory and internal affairs. 180 Frequently championed by Member
States and referenced by the General Assembly, Article 2(7) is a primary safeguard of Member
State’s rights against U.N. infringement. Still, as in the emergency context where the
government may derogate from certain human rights safeguards to address a national threat, so
too may the Council intervene without consent in the ostensibly domestic matters of its
constituent units where they are deemed to threaten the greater international good.
¶94
Once clear of the proscriptions of Article 2 and their practical effects, the Council has
construed its powers under Chapter VII broadly. Article 42’s examples of military actions
176

Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, at 353, 356 (June 27). See also G.A. Res.
2625 (Oct. 24, 1970).
177
In addition to Article 42’s use of force provisions, other measures contemplating a suspension of Article 2(4)
include self-defense (individual or collective) under the provisions of Article 51, and regional action under Article
53. U.N. Charter arts. 2 (4), 42, 51, 53.
178
Id. at art. 2, para. 7 (“Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in
matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state…but this principle shall not prejudice the
application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.”).
179
FRANCK, supra note 14, at 222.
180
See, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities, supra note 178 at 356; see also DAN SAROOSHI, INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS AND THEIR EXERCISE OF SOVEREIGN POWERS 9 (Ian Brownlie ed., Oxford Univ. Press) (2005).
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available to the Council were inserted at the request of the Soviet Union as a consolation for its
failure to insert a more exhaustive provision. 181 Owing at least in part to these partial
declarations of power provided in Articles 41 and 42, courts have acknowledged the myriad
implied powers nevertheless possessed by the Council. 182 Through this judicial creation of
implied powers, the courts have bolstered the Council’s far-reaching interpretation of its
capabilities. More importantly, the kompetenz-kompetenz of the Council has flourished as the
international community has struggled to determine the authority of courts, particularly the ICJ,
to review Council resolutions. Given this judicial backdrop, the Council has taken liberties in
construing its Chapter VII vires.
2. The Breadth of Chapter VII Powers as Determined by the Council’s Kompetenz-Kompetenz
¶95

The expansion of Chapter VII powers over the years has been a two-fold practice,
involving both more frequent resort to “typical” Chapter VII exercises and affixing the Chapter
VII label to a broader range of enterprises. With respect to “peacekeeping,” Chapter VII
authority was previously invoked in enforcement missions designed to induce one or more
parties to adhere to peace arrangements. 183 That authority has now been extended to many new
operations more accurately described as complex peace operations involving variants of
peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Additionally, the Council’s frequent use of the
blanket “all necessary means” mandate has expanded the discretionary use of Chapter VII within
such missions.
¶96
Today, the exercise of Chapter VII power is not simply more eclectic but also more
profound. Chapter VII resolutions often demand change from economic, legal and constitutional
systems both at the international and domestic level. This was evident in Kosovo, where the
U.N. not only redefined the system of government, but spearheaded the privatization of the
economy as well. It is also apparent in the U.N. operation in Cote d’Ivoire, where—much to the
chagrin of the Ivorian President 184 —Resolution 1721 gave the Prime Minister full authority to
carry out the peace process, effectively re-allocating many functions of a sovereign government
between its branches.
¶97
This expansion of Chapter VII is nowhere more apparent than in the area of international
criminal law. Though its ability to modify standards of immunity in Chapter VII operations has
long been recognized, 185 the Council has assumed new prominence in the international judicial
181

Indeed, throughout the drafting process, efforts to add to Article 42’s list were rejected as implying the exclusion
of other actions, thus “restricting the range of measures available to the” Council. CHESTERMAN, supra note 70, at
751.
182
For example, in the Tadic case, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) concluded
that “the measures set out in Article 41 are merely illustrative examples which obviously do not exclude other
measures.” Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, ¶35. The International Court of Justice’s (ICJ) Advisory Opinion in the
Namibia case held that “the powers of the Council under Article 24 are not restricted to the specific grants of
authority contained in Chapters VI, VII, VIII and XII . . . . the Members of the United Nations have conferred upon
the Security Council powers commensurate with its responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security.” Legal
Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa)
Notwithstanding Security Council resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. ¶ 110; see also U.N. Charter
art. 24 (on the functions and powers of the Security Council).
183
TREVOR FINDLAY, THE USE OF FORCE IN UN PEACE OPERATIONS 5 (Oxford Univ. Press) (2002).
184
S.C. Res. 1721, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1721 (Nov. 1, 2006); BBC News, PM Signals New Ivorian Stand-Off, Nov. 8,
2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6130248.stm.
185
See Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, art. V, Feb. 13 1946, 1 U.N.T.S. 15; see
also Frederick Rawski, To Waive or Not To Waive: Immunity and Accountability in U.N. Peacekeeping Operations,
18 CONN. J. INT ’L. L. 103, 104 (2002).
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system in the past decade. Under Chapter VII pretenses, the Council has created a system of
criminal justice tribunals that has perhaps extemporaneously helped overcome, or circumvent,
the procedural and jurisdictional shortcomings of the ICJ and the International Criminal Court
(ICC).
¶98
In domestic systems, establishing such dual-court systems is a far-reaching but not
infrequent exercise of emergency power. It is also a power subject to executive abuse and
lacking constitutional constraints. 186 Though the Security Council has not abused its powers in
creating special tribunals, its exercise of exceptional power is similar in using decree or
resolution to overcome the limitations of the existing system in exceptional matters pertaining to
transitional justice and security. In Resolution 1315, for example, the Council acted under its
Chapter VII authority to solidify agreement on a Special Court for Sierra Leone to try those
responsible for crimes against humanity and other serious violations of international
humanitarian law. 187 More famously, under Resolutions 827 and 955 the Council established the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), respectively. 188 Whether the Courts’ establishment was ultra vires,
or grounded in the Council’s implied powers or authority to establish subsidiary organs, was the
subject of considerable debate. 189 When presented with the question, the Appellate Chamber of
the ICTY determined that the Security Council was competent to create a judicial tribunal based
on its powers under Article 41. 190
¶99
In these cases, the Council utilized its Chapter VII powers stemming from exceptional
post-conflict situations to establish a new tier of courts designed to handle cases particularly
linked to international security. Though these special tribunals are not entirely analogous to
domestic security courts insofar as they often operate where foundational judicial systems are
lacking, a parallel is worth noting. In each, the Council sought to overcome the procedural and
jurisdictional limitations of existing venues, while creating a forum prone to acting more reliably
and predictably in a manner consistent with Council interests. In so doing, Council action
parallels that of domestic regimes in seeking to take particularly important security interests out
of the hands of the “unsatisfactory” regular courts. However, asserting this greater executive
role in judicial affairs compromises the independence of the judicial branch, and corrodes the
distinction between governmental functions.
B. The Melding Together of Governance Functions under Chapter VII
¶100

Domestic emergency powers have a tendency to creep into non-emergency spheres and
thereby weaken republican and constitutional safeguards in these areas. Historically,
governments have proven altogether too susceptible to the “narcotic effect” of the lessburdensome governance mechanism. 191 In Italy, for example, a constitutional provision allowing
186

Denis J. Sullivan, Countries at the Crossroads 2005, Country Report: Egypt, FREEDOM HOUSE ,
http://www.freedomhouse.org/modules/publications/ccr/modPrintVersion.cfm?edition=2&ccrpage=8&ccrcountry=8
4 (last visited Feb. 21, 2007); see also Lesch, supra note 138.
187
S.C. Res. 1315, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1315 (Aug. 14, 2000).
188
S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993); S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc.S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994).
189
See, e.g., Alex Marschik, The Security Council as World Legislator? Theory, Practice & Consequences of an
Expanding World Power, INST . FOR INT ’L. L. & JUST . Working Paper 2005/18 11 (2005)
http://www.iilj.org/papers/documents/2005.18Marschik.pdf.
190
Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, ¶¶ 28-38.
191
GROSS AND NÍ AOLÁIN, supra note 17, at 233 (citing Mordechai Mironi, Back to Work Emergency Orders:
Government Intervention in Labor Disputes in Essential Services, 15 Mishpatim 350, 380-86 (1986)).
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the government to adopt “provisional measures having the force of law” in situations of
“necessity and emergency” has since blossomed into a customary practice of “executive
legislation by law-decrees.” No longer contained within the emergency, these law decrees are
now the “normal form of legislation.”192
¶101
Under the auspices of Chapter VII, the Security Council has extended its jurisdiction well
beyond the traditional realm of the executive branch, and asserted its competence to legislate and
occasionally act in a quasi-judicial fashion. In addition to its aforementioned willingness to
establish new judicial fora, the Council has also shown a propensity to use Chapter VII
resolutions to make determinations regarding legality on its own. In this manner, it effectively
bypasses the international legal system entirely.
¶102
Admittedly, the Council has long made legal determinations in resolutions that have not
invoked Chapter VII. In 1965, the Council condemned the regime in Southern Rhodesia and
found its declaration of independence to have “no legal validity.”193 Three years later, the
Council condemned an Israeli strike against the Beirut Airport as a “flagrant violation of the
United Nations Charter and [prior] cease- fire resolutions.”194 Later, it determined by resolution
that the Israeli practice of establishing settlements in occupied territories had no legal validity; it
also notably found that the presence of South Africa in Namibia was “illegal and that
consequently all acts taken by the Government on behalf of or concerning Namibia after the
termination of the Mandate [would be] illegal.”195 Though certainly possessing judicial
language, without the legally binding force of Chapter VII, suc h declarations were at worst
political and at best advisory. 196
¶103
More recently, however, the Council has made legal determinations under Chapter VII
authority. Following a non-Chapter VII determination that the annexation of Kuwait had “no
legal validity” and was to be “considered null and void,”197 the Council acting under Chapter VII
in Resolution 670 commented that Iraq had “committed grave breaches” of the Geneva
Convention. 198 Subsequently, in Resolution 687 the Council determined that Iraq “[was] liable
under international law for any direct loss, damage, including environmental damage and the
depletion of natural resources, or injury to foreign Governments, nationals and corporations, as a
result of Iraq’s unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait.”199 It further determined that Iraqi
statements repudiating foreign debt “were null and void.”200 Supported by the binding force of
Chapter VII, as well as Council-created enforcement mechanisms (in this case, a Compensation
Commission), such determinations represent the Council’s assumption of judicial functions,
albeit with little augmentation of corresponding fact- finding, intelligence or procedural checks.
192

A GAMBEN, supra note 17, at 17-18.
S.C. Res. 217, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/217 (Nov. 20, 1965).
194
S.C. Res. 248, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/248 (March 24, 1968).
195
S.C. Res. 446, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/446 (March 22, 1979); S.C. Res. 276, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/276 (Jan. 30,
1970).
196
In the case of the Namibian resolution, the Finnish representative proposed that the Council subsequently ask the
International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion on the “legal consequences for States of the continued
presence of South Africa in Namibia, notwithstanding Security Council resolution 276.” The Soviet Union and
Poland abstained, preferring the earlier political declaration to a genuine legal opinion, but the Council nevertheless
adopted the proposal and referred the question to the Court. BAILEY, supra note 163, at 244-45. The Council’s
determination was, by this tacit admission, a political one; to give it legal weight, a judgment by the International
Court of Justice was still needed.
197
S.C. Res. 662, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/662 (Aug. 9, 1990).
198
S.C. Res. 670, ¶ 13, U.N. Doc. S/RES/670 (Sept. 25, 1990).
199
S.C. Res. 687, ¶ 16, U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (Apr. 3, 1991).
200
Id. ¶ 17.
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¶104

The Security Council has also used Chapter VII to justify its assumption of legislative
competences. 201 Wary that “the suppression of international terrorism is essential for the
maintenance of international peace and security,” the Council in 1999 enacted Resolution 1267,
imposing sanctions—most notably, the freezing of funds—against designated members of the
Taliban so as to deter and prevent their support for suspected terrorists. 202 In the process, it
created a body to oversee state implementation. Subsequent to the 9/11 attacks in the United
States, the Security Council directly targeted actors directly responsible for terrorism.
Resolution 1373 again invoked Chapter VII, defining terrorism as a threat to international peace
and security, and obliging Member States to prevent and suppress the financing of terrorism,
criminalize the willful provision or collection of funds to and from a terrorist group, and freeze
the funds of individuals and entities facilitating terrorist acts. 203 It further established the
Counter-Terrorism Committee to monitor implementation of the measures laid out. 204
¶105
Though this counterterrorism regime has successfully frozen hundreds of millions of
dollars in assets of entities and individuals tied to terrorist networks, 205 it is more notable here for
its establishment of a prospective regime of some permanence. Whereas Chapter VII has
traditionally provided for post-hoc enforcement measures, the Council has used its exceptional
powers to criminalize certain activities as well as to create forward-looking bodies. In the
process, questions of propriety and institutional competence arise. Moreover, the needed clarity
of legislation-by-resolution is called into question by the linguistic vagaries of diplomatic
compromise. The Councils’ legislative acts have not gone unnoticed. India expressed concern
“at the increasing tendency of the Security Council in recent years to assume legislative and
treaty- making powers on behalf of the international community, binding on all States.”206 Nepal
cautioned that the Council “should work within its mandate” and “resist the temptation of acting
as a world legislature, a world administration and a world court rolled into one.”207 Several other
countries noted that although legislation was beyond its competence, the Council could so act but
only under exceptional circumstances when faced with an urgent threat. 208
¶106
Even if Chapter VII did grant legislative authority to the Council, the Council still would
have improperly extended that authority, as the urgency of the threat addressed by Chapter VII
legislation is not always apparent. As mentioned in Sectio n II, the Council has acted multiple
times under Chapter VII “in the interests of international peace and security” to immunize peace
operations personnel of contributing States not parties to the Rome Statute. 209 It has even done
so in operations where it has referred other crimes to the International Criminal Court’s
201

Legislation is here used to refer to broadly applicable, prospective measures not restricted to the immediate
situation from which they arose, nor limited to named entities nor by time. Stefan Talmon, The Security Council as
World Legislature, 99 Am. J. Int’l L. 175, 177 (2005).
202
See S.C. Res. 1214, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1214 (Dec. 8, 1998); see also S.C. Res. 1267, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267 (Oct.
15, 1999).
203
S.C. Res. 1373, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001).
204
Id. ¶ 6. Later resolutions imposed travel restrictions as well. S.C. Res. 1617, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1617 (July 29,
2005). See also S.C. Res. 1540, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1540 (April 28, 2004); S.C. Res. 1566, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1566
(Oct. 8, 2004).
205
Press Release, United States Department of Treasury, Treasury Report on Progress in the War on Terrorist
Financing (Sept. 11, 2003), http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/js721.pdf.
206
The Permanent Representative of India, Letter to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security
Council, U.N. Doc. S/2004/329 (Apr. 28, 2004).
207
U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess., 4950th mtg. at 14, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4950 (Apr. 22, 2004).
208
Id. at 5, 28; U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess., 4956th mtg. at 3, UN Doc. S/PV.4956 (Apr. 28, 2004).
209
S.C. Res. 1422, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1422 (July 12, 2002); S.C. Res. 1487, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1487 (June 12,
2003).
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jurisdiction. 210 In granting immunity and changing the burden of prosecution to prove that the
alleged act was not “arising out of or related to the operation,” the Council has effectively
legislated on a noticeably “normal” matter traditionally decided by convention and treaty. In so
doing, it has taken advantage of the less cumbersome processes required for Chapter VII action
and abused the notion of exception inherent in Chapter VII’s constitutional and normative basis.
¶107
The entrenchment and creep of Chapter VII powers into spheres previously outside of the
Chapter VII jurisdiction is an evolution reminiscent of emergency powers that further suggests
the merit of a common juridical approach to the two powers.
C. The Limits of Emergency Powers
¶108

In many emergency situations, limits on governmental power are difficult to discern.
Blanket authorizations providing for variants of “all necessary measures” imply a political space
for decision closed to legal intervention. Yet even where authorizations are broad and malleable,
domestic and international courts alike have found discernable substantive limits to such
authorizations. Fundamental rights and corresponding judicial guarantees, such as habeus corpus
and amparo, have been treated as beyond the reach of emergency powers, 211 and form the
backbone of a burgeoning system of checks on the exercise of emergency powers. These
constraints fall into two broad categories—ex ante and ex post.
1. Ex Ante Limits

¶109

The first locus of limits on emergency power lies within the basic law, typically a
constitution—the traditional bulwark against the arbitrary exercise of government power.
Certain constitutions include threadbare “all necessary measures” provisions without further
guidance, such as the infamous Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution; other constitutions
specify the scope of emergency powers more explicitly. Some delineate those rights that are not
subject to restriction or modification, 212 while others enumerate provisions and rights that can be
suspended through the use of emergency powers. 213 In either case, constitutional limits provide
ex ante limits to the exercise of exceptional power and form an important basis for judicial
review. Statutory restraints similarly codify limits to governmental discretion, but prove more
pliable and less enduring in practice. The Turkish experience, for example, illustrates the
weakness of statutory limits, as emergency decrees there have expanded the theoretically “fixed”
list of permissible actions on several occasions. 214
¶110
A final ex ante domestic limit, the sunset clause, appears in both constitutional and
statutory schemes. Sunset clauses provide notice to all parties that actions taken under
emergency justification will expire after a finite period of time, and secure, at least formally, the
temporary nature of emergency powers.

210

See S.C. Res. 1593, ¶¶ 4, 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005).
See Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Judicial Guarantees in States of Emergency (Arts 27(2), 25 and 8
American Convention on Human Rights), Inter-Am. C.H.R., OAS/Ser.L/III.19, doc.13 (1988).
212
See, e.g., PORT . CONST . art. 19(6); Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Konst. RF] [Constitution] art. 56(3)
(Russ.); S. A FR. CONST . 1996 art. 37.
213
See, e.g., Constitución [Constitution] art. 55 (C.E. 1978) (Span.); FIJI CONST . art. 187(3) (1997); PAN. CONST . art.
51 (2004); EL SAL. CONST . art. 29 (1983).
214
State of Emergency Law, arts. 9, 11 (1983) (Turk.).
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In concert with these domestic constraints, the non-derogable provisions in international
human rights instruments provide a tangible set of standards guiding valid exercise of emergency
powers. Still, the impact of these ex ante limits depends on effective enforcement mechanisms.
2. Ex Post: Review

¶112

It has been the province of courts of general review and international courts of human
rights to secure the proper exercise of emergency power. 215 Nonetheless, many domestic and
international courts have failed to do so. Domestically, where judicial review is not barred by
constitutional or legislative provision, judges have frequently proven unwilling to rule against
the government where information is incomplete and decisions may in fact come at a
“subsequent cost” to national security. 216 Because of these concerns, judicial review has been
inconsistent in many countries. 217
¶113
International courts have likewise struggled with the concept of emergency review, often
extending the “margin of appreciation” doctrine to account for their limitations. As in the
domestic setting, incomplete information and difficult standards of review complicate the task of
international courts, as does their limited fact- finding capabilities. Reports compiled under
provisions such as Article 40 of the ICCPR fail as substitutes, as they are largely “unfocused,
subject to substantial delays, and unequipped either to produce or test the veracity of relevant
information.”218 Paucity of information is only one challenge facing international courts; another
is applying the evidence to a legal framework. Here, the political nature of the question
continues to hinder judicial review. 219 In spite of these infirmities, substantive judicial review
has developed and been supplemented if not sustained by international courts. Though
inconsistent rulings have often reflected political rather than legal principles, 220 an emergency
jurisprudence of at least some coherence has emerged. Those court decisions challenging
governmental action have revolved primarily around fundamental principles of necessity and
proportionality, although some cases have been decided on reasonableness grounds as well. 221
¶114
The emergency doctrine’s requirement that measures not exceed the extent warranted can
appear ex ante in domestic law, 222 and has been inferred by reviewing courts as a corollary to the
“strictly required” derogation provisions of the international human rights instruments. 223 Under
215

While some countries have established special tribunals mandated to review appeals relating to particular
regulations, they are prone to executive abuse and contain lesser procedural safeguards.
216
David Cole, Judging the Next Emergency: Judicial Review and Individual Rights in Times of Crisis, 101 M ICH.
L. REV. 2565, 2566 (2003).
217
As an example, consider Israel, where for over forty years no emergency regulation was invalidated as
“unreasonable.” M ENACHEM HOFNUNG, DEMOCRACY, LAW AND NATIONAL SECURITY IN ISRAEL 64 (Dartmouth
Publishing 1996).
218
Joan Hartman, Derogation from Human Rights Treaties in Public Emergencies, 22 HARV. INT ’L L. J. 1, 41
(1981).
219
See, e.g., A. v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t., (2004) QB 335 at 110, 151 (holding that the decision as to
which powers were to be employed was a political matter, on which judicial judgment could not be made); see also,
DYZENHAUS, supra note 17, at 177.
220
GROSS AND NÍ AOLÁIN, supra note 17, at 274-75 (analyzing the European Court’s strong stance in The Greek
Case and concluding that “where ostensibly democratic states have engaged in the suspension of certain rights
guaranteed under the convention, the commission and court have been less exacting in their requirements”).
221
In Karunathilaka and Another v. Dayananda Dissanayake, Comm’r of Election and Others Case No. 1, 1 Sri
L.R. 157, 179-81 (1999), the Sri Lankan Supreme Court invalidated an emergency measure suspending a local
election poll date as having no reasonable nexus to the national emergency.
222
See, e.g., Basic Law: The Government, art. 38(e) (Isr.).
223
Aksoy v. Turkey, 23 E.H.R.R. 553, ¶ 84 (1996) (holding a 14-day detention impermissibly disproportionate to
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the European Court’s jurisprudence, the principle of proportionality is a multi- faceted one. The
monitoring organ must consider the need for and scale of a given measure, the need for
suspending implicated rights, the manner in which the measure has been applied in practice, and
the nature and intensity of a threat over time and at a given moment. 224
¶115
The axiom of necessity has provided a less yielding and more objective basis for judicial
intervention. It does so not as a prospective source of authorization, but as a limiting
consideration. 225 The necessity requirement applies equally to the “duration, geographical
coverage and material scope” of the emergency and measures of derogation resorted to. 226 In
1976, the European Court in Handyside v. United Kingdom differentiated the “strictly required”
standard of the Convention from an ordinary standard of necessity or proportionality,
determining that it instead meant “indispensability.” Though it split ten to nine in the ultimate
outcome of case, the Court unanimously agreed upon the stricter standard. 227 Despite the
continuing judicial concession to discretion, this standard has been used since to invalidate
measures even where courts have agreed with a government’s assessment that a public
emergency exists. 228
¶116
It is difficult to see consistency in a history of cases that at once establishes a textually
strict standard while simultaneously conceding a wide margin of discretion to the defending
state’s interpretation. It raises the concern that judicial review in such cases is simply a rubber
stamp, creating legitimacy that in fact has not been earned. Yet it cannot be denied that courts
have intervened against questionable government practice. The consistency sought might in the
end lie in the fact that courts scrutinize emergency measures more vigorously than they have the
original question of whether a valid emergency exists. Irrespective of whether such explanation
is more empirical observation or normative suggestion, it allows for the relegation of discretion
to one step of the bifurcated question of emergency, and the use of manageable judicial standards
in the latter step. In so doing, it allows for the reconciliation of the political nature of
emergency, and substantive judicial review utilizing the bedrock principles necessity and
proportionality.

the threat posed); cf. Brannigan v. United Kingdom, 258 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1993) (holding a 7-day detention
proportionate).
224
See ORAÁ, supra note 33, at 148-49 (summarizing the bases for decision of the European Court in several cases,
including Ireland v. United Kingdom, Lawless, and the Greek Case).
225
See Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. The State of Israel, HCJ 5100/94 (1999), ¶ 34-36; cf. Michael
Stokes Paulsen, The Constitution of Necessity, 79 Notre Dame L. Rev., 1257 (2004) (“[t]he Constitution itself
embraces an overrid ing principle of constitutional and national self-preservation that operates as a meta-rule of
construction for the document's specific provisions and that may even, in cases of extraordinary necessity, trump
specific constitutional requirements”). The wo rds of William Pitt echo the need for caution: “Necessity is the plea
for every infringement of human freedom. It is the argument of tyrants; it is the creed of slaves.” William Pitt,
Speech to the House of Commons, 12 PARL . HIST . ENG. (Nov. 18, 1783).
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General Comment No. 29, supra note 32, ¶ 4.
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Handyside v. United Kingdom, 1 E.H.R.R. 737 (1976); cf. The Greek Case (Report of the Commission), 1 Eur.
Ct. H.R. at 176 (1969) (state enjoys a “certain measure of discretion in assessing the extent strictly required by the
exigencies of the situation”).
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See, e.g., Demir v. Turkey (21380/93), Eur. Ct. H.R. 88, ¶ 51 (1998); Castillo Petruzzi v. Peru, Inter-Am.
C.H.R., (ser. C), No. 52, ¶ 204 (1999).
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D. Limits on Chapter VII Power
1. Constitutionality

¶117

Under Article 103 of the Charter, the obligations of Member States prevail over those
provided for by treaty. 229 In light of their relative hierarchical positions as sources of
international law, customary international law short of jus cogens is subject to preemption by
Chapter VII action as well. 230 In contrast, peremptory norms of jus cogens do not permit
derogation; in the words of Judge ad hoc Elihu Lauterpacht in the Provisional Measures stage of
the Genocide case, “the relief which Article 103 of the Charter may give the Security Council in
case of conflict . . . cannot . . . as a matter of simple hierarchy of norms . . . extend to a conflict
between a Security Council resolution and jus cogens.”231 As in the domestic setting, even
emergency cannot justify departure from certain non-derogable norms.
¶118
Jus cogens does not represent the only ex ante constraint on Chapter VII. The Council, as
a creature of the Charter, must abide by some form of a constitutional rule of law. Indeed, even a
weak construction of the constitutional maxim that “a stream cannot rise higher than its
source”232 suggests that the Council’s authority is simultaneously conferred and limited by the
Charter, even though the Council may enjoy broader powers than the states delegating those
powers to it. 233 The ICTY has asserted that the Council is “subjected to certain constitutional
limitations,”234 and while subseque nt practice has conclusively ruled some out, 235 several
substantive limits remain.
i) Human Rights
¶119
First and foremost among substantive limits are the principles and purposes of the U.N.
Under Article 24 of the Charter, the Council “shall act in accordance with the Purposes and
Principles of the United Nations,” which include the promotion of human rights. 236 Such a
mandate was not simply intended as a hortatory gesture; during the San Francisco conference,
the U.S. delegate noted that “the Charter had to be considered in its entirety and if the Security
Council violated its principles and purposes it would be acting ultra vires.”237
¶120
Unfortunately, the purposes and principles have proven “abstract, general, difficult to
apply and sometimes irreconcilable.”238 This is particularly the case with respect to the
exceptional nature of the Security Council. The uneasy combination of mandatory “shall”
terminology with non- legal and vague language like the “promotion of human rights” begs the
question whether human rights law in fact strictly limits Council action, or is simply a factor to
be considered. At the time of drafting, more comprehensive formulations met with little
229

U.N. Charter art. 103.
SCHWEIGMAN , supra note 96, at 196; see also ZWANENBURG, supra note 15, at 156.
231
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Yugo.), 1993 I.C.J. Rep. 440, ¶ 100 (Prov. Measures of Sept. 13) (separate opinion of Lauterpacht).
232
Australian Communist Party v. Commonwealth (1951) 83 C.L.R. 1 at 258.
233
SAROOSHI (1999), supra note 20, at 26-27.
234
Tadic, Case No. IT-94-I-AR72, ¶ 28.
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See Certain Expenses of the U.N., supra note 16, at 167 (determining that measures under Chapter VII do not
require the conclusion of Article 43 agreements); see also SIMMA, supra note 70, at 753 (observing that the Council
may immediately turn to the provisions of 42 without having previously attempted measures under Article 41).
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See U.N. Charter arts. 1, 2, 24.
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Doc. 555.III/27, 11 UNCIO, at 379, quoted in SCHWEIGMAN, supra note 96, at 29.
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success. 239 Amendments to Article 24 clarifying the legal status of the provision and refinement s
of the obligation later in Chapter VII were rejected, at least in part because Member States felt
they were sufficiently explained elsewhere. 240 State-centered approaches to later treaties forming
the basis of human rights law further call into question whether Article 24(2), in concert with
Article 1(3), provides for the binding application of human rights law to Chapter VII action.
Though the UN Human Rights Committee has emphasized that the ICCPR is designed to
safeguard individual human beings, and is not simply a web of inter-State obligations, 241 the
ICCPR only legally binds states. While human rights law is broadly applicable to the U.N.
through its constitutional assumptions and as a subject of international law, its binding effect on
the Council is dubious.
¶121
Still, human rights law as applied via the Purposes and Principles provisions remains
pertinent to Chapter VII action. Lauterpacht cautioned that one should not “overlook the
significance of” Article 24(2)’s requirement. 242 Judge Weeramantry’s dis sent in the Lockerbie
case notes that Article 24(2) represents a “circumscribing boundary,” imposing an “imperative”
duty to follow “categorically stated” limits. 243 Notwithstanding these concerns, at least one court
has decided that there is only one limit to the binding effect of Council resolutions: “they must
observe the fundamental peremptory provisions of jus cogens.”244
¶122
Clearly, there is a distinction between the political responsibility to “promote” on one
hand, and the legal responsibility to guarantee245 on the other. At present, the Purposes and
Principles provisions of the Charter present an unsatisfactory constraint on a Chapter VII
authority that transcends general international law. Accordingly, courts have been unwilling to
treat the Council’s adherence to its Principles and Purposes as a binding conception.
ii) Necessity and Proportionality
A second constitutional check—necessity and proportionality—may more rigorously apply
human rights responsibilities to Council action. Necessity is written into the plain language of
the Charter to constrain Chapter VII action. Specifically, measures under Article 42 are only
available to the Council if action under Article 41 “would be inadequate;” that is, measures
involving the use of force are only permissible where necessary to restore international peace and
security if lesser measures prove, or are assumed, incapable of doing so. Moreover, even when
validly acting under Article 42, the Council may only take such action “as may be necessary.”246
¶124
As in the domestic context, the notion of necessity is tied to imminence. Accordingly,
preventive war has been argued to be “unequivocally illegal” and beyond the reach of Council
power. 247 The Security Council has never conceded that a force authorization may be based on a
¶123
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“potential” nor “non-imminent threat of violence.”248 Frequently, the Council issues warnings to
offending States through non-Chapter VII resolutions in an attempt to avoid intervening before
the conflict, or perhaps more accurately Member States’ willingness to respond to the nascent
conflict, ripens. Resolutions provide for discretion to be exercised by authorized actors in
matters of policy and operations, but only to the extent such decisions and actions are necessary
to further the mandate or some subsection thereof. In addition, mandates frequently provide for
“further authorization as necessary in the light of developments,”249 allowing for the narrow
tailoring of mandates to the threat level faced at a given point in time.
2. Judicial Revie w
¶125

The jurisprudence of the ICJ reveals a Court which, content to assert its relevance, has
done little more than carve out a narrow role through which it can undertake incidental review. 250
Still, as the U.S. case Marbury v. Madison illustrates, this very assertion of competence is in the
long run important. 251 Though the Court has yet to intervene in Council action, it has established
its legal authority to do so.
¶126
ICJ jurisdiction over Council action has two primary bases. Under Article 96 of the
Charter, the Council “may request” an advisory opinion “on any legal question.”252 The
propriety of Council action may also arise incidentally in a case between two states. In rendering
its decision on the jurisdictional objections of the U.S. in the Nicaragua case, the Court firmly
established its authority to decide on matters under the Council’s Chapter VII purview. The
Court stated that although the Council exercises functions of a “political nature” in contrast to
the Court’s “purely judicial functions,” “both organs can . . . perform their separate but
complementary functions with respect to the same events.”253 “Even after a determination under
Article 39,” the Court found that it could adjudicate on matters already the focus of Council
action. 254 It repeated this assertion in the Provisional Measures stage of the Genocide case,
holding that Council action could not violate jus cogens. 255
¶127
In the Lockerbie case, the ICJ again ambiguously asserted its competence. 256 In its
decision on concurrent jurisdiction in the provisional measures stage, the Court noted that “a
http://cesr.org/filestore2/download/523/tearinguptherules.pdf.
248
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250
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decision of the Security Council properly taken in the exercise of its competence . . . cannot be
summarily reopened,” and Resolution 748 satisfied this condition. 257 Still, the validity of
Council resolutions was prima facie, rather than an irrebuttable presumption. 258 A Chapter VII
measure outside of the Council’s competence, or not “properly taken,” could well be subject to
later review. Several judges, however, expressed doubt as to whether Resolutio n 748 prejudiced
the functions of the Court, and as such lacked validity. 259 Judge Krzysztof Skubiszewski’s
dissent in the East Timor case later supported this position, arguing that “the Court is competent .
. . to interpret and apply the resolutions of the Organization” and “make findings on their
lawfulness, in particular whether they were intra vires.” In other words, “the decisions of the
Organization . . . are subject to scrutiny by the Court with regard to their legality, validity and
effect.”260
¶128
As acknowledged by the Legal Consequences case, though, the Court possesses no general
power to review Council resolutions adopted under Chapter VII. 261 Rather, it is an “incidental
jurisdiction”262 by which the Court can assess the validity of Council action where relevant to the
determination of state disputes. Additionally, as Jose Alvarez notes, its jurisdictional limits
make it unlikely that the Court would find a Council decision “null and void” per se, but rather
“illegal” as applied to the parties. 263
3. The “Parliamentary” Check
¶129

Article 24 of the Charter dictates that the Council has “primary,” but not sole,
responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security. Consequently, the Council encounters
a republican check on its Chapter VII powers. Unlike checks common to domestic emergency
regimes, however, the General Assembly cannot restrain the affirmative exercise of Council
power; it can only act in the face of Council inaction.
¶130
Article 10 of the Charter gives the General Assembly the power to review matters within
the jurisdiction of any UN organ and make recommendations, unless the matter is “actually
before the Security Council.”264 Under the Uniting for Peace resolution, passed by a strong
majority, the General Assembly reserved the right to make recommendations for “collective
measures” where “there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of
aggression” and the Council has failed to “exercise its primary responsibility.” 265 In case of a
breach of the peace or act of aggression, the General Assembly further permits itself to
recommend the use of armed force when necessary. 266 For example, the Uniting for Peace
Resolution served as the basis for the U.N. Peacekeeping force in the Congo and later the U.N.
Command for an Emergency Force deployed to the Egypt-Israel border. 267 Though its validity
257
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was largely affirmed by the opinion, the International Court of Justice in Certain Expenses
clarified that the power of the General Assembly to act in the maintenance of international peace
and security was a residual one, and did not include “coercive,” “preventive or enforcement
measures . . . under Chapter VII.”268
¶131
In summary, the General Assembly does constrain the discretion of the Council in its use
of Chapter VII. But it does so only as a lower bound. Beyond political opprobrium and its
authority over the budgetary allotments for peace operations, the Assembly cannot formally act
to restrain Council measures under Chapter VII; it can only act in its stead. This is not itself a
nullity. Where the Council hesitates, the General Assembly’s recommendations may shape the
ultimate character of later Council action through resource commitments and operational design.
Therefore, while the General Assembly’s “Uniting for Peace” authority does not provide the post
hoc or parliamentary check seen in emergency regimes, it continues to limit Council discretion in
its response to emergency.
4. The Hard and Soft Check of Political Considerations
¶132

The institutional backdrop of Council Chapter VII action most clearly diverges from that
of the domestic exercise of emergency powers in the sphere of political checks. The Council’s
heterogeneous composition and “equality” amongst the P-5 (as guaranteed by the veto) creates a
decidedly non- unitary body. In this context, the veto power serves as a hard, albeit non-judicial,
limit on the Council’s exercise of Chapter VII authority; but it can just as easily be used as an
obstructionist tool thwarting the valid, and perhaps necessary, exercise of power.
¶133
The Council’s need for legitimacy, on the other hand, represents a soft political check of
some importance. 269 Recent experiences indicate that the Council’s use of Chapter VII powers
may be growing faster than contributors’ willingness to act. 270 Unlike a domestic government,
the Council has no sovereign rights, nor does it possess a monopoly on force. It relies on the
legitimacy of its decisions, as well as the moral and political import of its actions, to secure the
resources needed to effectuate its designated measures. In a system where countries outside of
the P-5 voluntarily contribute the vast majority of personnel, case-by-case compliance depends
in large part on “perceptions of the legitimacy of the [C]ouncil and its actions.”271 This
legitimacy, in turn, depends on “some combination of conformity to shared norms and to
established law.”272 The challenge once more is to constitutionalize the practice of the Council
through constraints political and legal, procedural and substantive, soft and hard.
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E. Limiting Council Power
¶134

Again, reference to the regulative ideal of emergency suggests that the Council exercise of
Chapter VII power is subject to legal constraints. Reform might emerge in any of several
contexts, including the ICJ’s undertaking of an increased reviewing role.
¶135
The ICJ could reassess its Charter analysis, and import the exacting standards of necessity
and proportionality into its review of Council action, whether incidental or general. Necessity
has been underutilized at the international level as grounds for judicial review. Written explicitly
into the Charter text, it provides a manageable judicial standard by which the Council’s political
discretion can be reined in. As in judicial review of emergency, necessity is a multi- faceted
analysis examining both the measures taken and the threat faced. The violation of human rights
law can and should be integrated into this analysis. Though one could imagine an analysis
wherein Council action that violates human rights law would be prima facie “unnecessary,” such
a dramatic change in existing legal practice is not required. Assuming robust scrutiny of review,
it is enough to treat failure to guarantee human rights as one of several factors in determining
whether an action is narrowly tailored to the threat faced. Such judicial analysis would further
drafters’ intent in promoting human rights, effectuate the plain text of the Charter, and assure
responsible and proportionate Council action. Practically, it would be a workable basis for
review that would avoid a paradigm shift from that of contemporary international judicial
oversight.
¶136
Moreover, the Court could advance the process through the amendment of its statute to
allow for more general jurisdiction over the Council, either in binding dispute resolution or
through a more broadly available channel of advisory opinions. A more substantive system of
review could emerge from modifications to the rules regarding advisory opinions, or within the
existing system through further judicial refinement of the terms of art “competence” and
“validity.” Though the ICJ has been prone to the same judicial deference in matters of
international peace and security that its domestic counterparts have in emergency affairs, the
potential for more substantive review exists.
¶137
The Council itself could create an independent subcommittee or organ dynamically
reviewing the proportionality, necessity and validity of its measures. Greater legal regard to the
necessity of Chapter VII action and development of an international “necessity jurisprudence”
would further add clarity to gray areas of Council action, such as humanitarian intervention. 273
The next Section explores an area where the need for limits is particularly compelling: Council
delegation of Chapter VII authority to other entities.
IV. CONTROLS ON DELEGATED AND AUTHORIZED ACTION
¶138

The decisions of the Security Council rely on the Secretariat and Member States for
enforcement. Council resolutions authorize these entities to take prescribed action, and in many
instances delegate discretionary powers to achieve the resolutions’ ends, subject to the contours
defined therein. 274 A resolution may delegate such power, whether it directly implicates Member
State action, as in the burgeoning field of “Council legislation,” or establishes a peace operation
authorized to use force under Chapter VII. Any analysis of Council action, therefore, must take
273
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into account its bifurcated nature, and appreciate the distinctions between Council design and
implementation by the authorized parties.
¶139
Recent practice has demonstrated the propensity of acting entities to not only recognize the
exceptional nature of Chapter VII, but also to rely on it to justify non-compliance with provisions
of international law, especially in the field of human rights. These violations, this article argues,
are in fact derogations, identical to the common exercise of emergency powers. Unfortunately,
such derogation has heretofore occurred in an unaccountable fashion. Though derogating actors
have justified their practices through the rhetoric of exception, they have not subscribed to the
legitimating checks of emergency. Against the backdrop of effete existing accountability
mechanisms at the level of implementation, this has opened the door to not simply derogation,
but violation as well. If exceptionalism is endemic to Council-authorized action, this article
argues that it should be practiced in accordance with the ideals of emergency doctrine. Given the
idiosyncrasies of the international architecture though, this ideal likely requires resort to a
pluralistic accountability system.
A. The Exception Mindset of Peace Operations
1. Exceptionalism Across Actors and Sectors
¶140

U.N. peace operations often arrive on the ground with a level of organization and
coherence mirroring that of their fractured host territories. 275 Counted amongst their maladies are
“countless ill-coordinated and overlapping bilateral and United Nations programmes,” “interagency competition preventing the best use of scarce resources,” and disagreement over the
hierarchy of mandates and international obligations. 276 Accountability mechanisms are often
muted as the United Nations assumes a measure of authority absent legal checks.
¶141
Against this tempestuous backdrop, a state of exception is often presumed. In the broad
sense, norms of interaction are “smudged” and the short-term commitment to liberal norms is
eased in order to promote long-term stability. 277 An air of legal malleability hovers over the
Chapter VII mission. In the area of reconstruc tion, a peace operation “is one of the rare settings
in which international institutions and aid organizations remain tolerant and sometimes actively
complicit in [leakage, widespread waste and bribery].”278 As concerns democratic reform, peace
operations have been known to interfere with the very same free exercise of democratic choice
that they otherwise seek to promote. In Bosnia, for example, the democracy mission turned into
what one author has deemed a “grotesque parody of democratic principles,” as political
statements that “could be construed” as expressions of support for territorial separation or
independence were proscribed by the Election Appeals Sub-Commission. 279 Believing such
inconsistencies justified by exceptional and temporary security situations, as well as the “all
275
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necessary means” backing of Chapter VII, actors across sectors have confidently proceeded. As
they have, a sense of exception has permeated the operational sphere. In the areas of rule-of- law
reform and human rights promotion, this has at times manifested itself in actions that have not
measured up to mandates’ lofty goals, as was the case in Kosovo.
2. Kosovo
¶142

The United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), which would become a “high- water
mark of international authority” and a sovereign government unto itself, 280 demonstrated several
of these symptoms. Despite a mandate that charged the mission with the protection of human
rights and an overarching standards system that required the establishment of an “[impartial]”
justice system “fully” respecting human rights, the mission often did not practice what it
preached. 281 In its executive role, UNMIK consistently operated above the law with an
unfettered veto authority through the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG)
over all decisions of the Provisional Institutions of Self- Government (PISG); at the same time, its
own actions were placed outside of the scope of judicial review. 282 It also infringed on the
independence of the judiciary, exerting “considerable influence on the practical aspects of the
courts’ work” through its administration of the courts, control of issues relating to remuneration
and authority for clarifying the applicable law. 283 The credibility of its rule-of- law component
was further compromised by unclear legislation, often subject to extensive delays and delinquent
public notification. 284 UNMIK appointment of judges and prosecutors without parliamentary
approval further violated the Constitutional Framework. 285 As UNMIK more frequently passed
emergency decrees and characterized its regulations as “political” to bypass legislative processes
and avoid local input, 286 it increasingly operated as if it were in a Chapter VII emergency.
¶143
These contradictory rule of law efforts reflect the tensions between efficacy, ownership
and accountability in UN operations. They also demonstrate a willingness to cut corners and
derogate from formal legal requirements on the part of a mission cognizant of the exceptional
situation it faces and the exceptional authority granted by Chapter VII. In many ways, this
exceptionalism is understandable; local pressure coupled with “sluggish” police deployment and
disintegrated infrastructure and institutions, such as that faced in East Timor, often makes rigid
adherence to liberal conceptions of law and rights impossible. 287 A comparable exceptionalism
on the part of UNMIK, though, was less excusable in its context.
280
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¶144

In matters of public order and internal security, the “sine qua non” of international
administration, 288 the paradigm of exception more closely reflected that of illegitimate
emergency. UNMIK practiced executive detention with some regularity in its earlier years, often
disregarding judicial determinations in the process. 289 In October 1999, three men first arrested
by KFOR were detained under UNMIK Regulation 1999/26 for a twelve month period. After a
panel of international judges found that evidence was insufficient for their detention and so
ordered their release, the SRSG nevertheless extended their detention by executive order. 290 This
exercise of executive power was repeated in the detention of an Albanian suspected of murdering
three Serbs, again ignoring a judicial order of release. 291 Successive executive orders
subsequently overruled a panel of international judges in extending the detention of four Kosovar
Albanians alleged to have been involved in the bombing of a bus escorted by KFOR in February
of 2001. 292 Under Regulation 2000/47’s operational immunity standard, no recourse was
available through which detention orders could be challenged, or compensation sought. 293
¶145
Faced with growing condemnation from the human rights community, UNMIK argued that
its actions were derogations justified by the “internationally-recognized emergency” in Kosovo.
Under such circumstances, “special measures” were permissible which “in the wider interests of
security” would “allow authorities to respond to the findings of intelligence that are not able to
be presented to the court system.”294 Still, there had never been any formal declaration of
emergency. Aware that the Former Yugoslav Republic was a signatory to the ICCPR and that as
such it might be necessary to declare a state of emergency, UNMIK had for some time in its
internal communications discussed the matter before the Secretary-General declared the
“emergency” to be “largely over.”295 Thus, no emergency was ever officially proclaimed, nor did
UNMIK ever comply with reporting requirements of the European Convention or the ICCPR, a
central principle of legitimate emergency doctrine.
¶146
Even had proper derogation measures been taken, the permissibility of UNMIK action in
these cases remains in doubt. In the Tadic case, the prosecution maintained that “it is part of
international law that a fair trial of accused persons will be rendered,” and the “Security Council
. . . should not take steps or measures which fly in the face of that.”296 Moreover, the ICJ has
observed that to “wrongfully . . . deprive human beings of their freedom and to subject them to
physical constraint in conditions of hardship is in itself manifestly incompatible with the
288
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principles of the Charter of the United Nations.”297 Guarantees of a regular trial in Articles 71
and 72 of the Fourth Geneva Convention reaffirm this principle. 298 Domestically, executive
detentions have long been targeted by review fora as suspect for their disproportionate and
discriminatory nature. 299 Over time, arbitrary deprivations of liberty and “deviations from the
fundamental principles of fair trial” have grown to be considered violations of non-derogable
rights and categorically invalid. 300
¶147
UNMIK’s experience thus represents a dubious invocation of emergency and a dangerous
example for robust Chapter VII operations. Especially questionable is the U.N.’s claim of an
“internationally recognized emergency,” as UNMIK had not reported derogations under any
human rights instrument. The most likely formal source of international recognition—the closest
thing resembling an official proclamation—is found in the Article 39 determination contained in
Resolution 1244. 301 If that is the case, the UN has embarked down a worrisome path, equating
Chapter VII with emergency despite the lack of corresponding guarantors of accountability.
3. Al-Jedda
¶148

The recent Al-Jedda case highlights the distinction between Council action and that of its
delegatees, and further depicts delegatees’ conflation of Chapter VII with emergency. Hilal
Abdul-Razzaq Ali Al-Jedda, a dual British and Iraqi citizen, was interned and detained in
October 2004 by the American- led Multi-National Force (MNF) while traveling in Iraq for
personal and business matters. 302 Thereafter, Al-Jedda brought an action against Britain, a
member of the MNF, under international human rights law (European Convention and the
ICCPR) and international humanitarian law (The Fourth Geneva Convention) seeking his release
and return to Britain. Both the Divisional Court and Court of Appeals found in Britain’s favor,
holding that the applicable regime established by Security Council Resolution 1546 overrode AlJedda’s rights under the major conventions. 303
¶149
The discretionary delegation of Chapter VII power is readily apparent in MNF’s calculated
language choices and self-defined parameters. Resolution 1546 determined that the situation in
Iraq constituted a threat to international peace and security, and pursuant to Chapter VII
authorized the MNF to take “all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of security
and stability in Iraq.”304 Though saying little more, the actual Council resolution dictated that
297
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such measure accord with a series of bilateral correspondence between Iraqi Prime Minister
Ayad Allawi and U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell. 305 In a letter dated June 5, 2004, Powell
noted that the MNF would undertake internment “where . . . necessary for imperative reasons of
security.”306
¶150
Citing the preemptive nature of Article 103 of the Charter, the Court of Appeals held that
“if the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII, considers that the exigencies posed by a
threat to the peace must override, for the duration of the emergency, the requirements of a human
rights convention [other than jus cogens] . . . the UN Charter has given it the power to so
provide.”307 Moreover, the responsibilities to promote human rights created in Articles 55 and 56
of the Charter did not create comparable obligations. 308 Resolution 1546, then, “qualified”
Britain’s outstanding human rights obligations for as long as necessary to “restore peace.” 309
¶151
The Court’s decision reflects the superimposition of the Council’s overriding authority in
invoking Chapter VII onto the actions and decisions of those delegatees and authorized actors
operating in Chapter VII contexts. It also depicts Chapter VII as emergency and permits
derogation, particularly in the field of human rights, by authorized actors where necessary for
security reasons. As such, Chapter VII effectively triggers the exception clauses of the major
human rights instruments; it is then left to the courts to ensure that the validating principles of
emergency doctrine are observed.
B. The Council Counterterrorism Regime and the Globalization of Emergency
¶152

With its comprehensive “list and sanctions” regime, the Council has established an
enduring and prospective multilateral counterterrorism strategy necessitating an entrenchment of
Chapter VII. As discussed previously, the system applies sanctions, such as travel restrictions
and the freezing of funds, to a list of individuals whom Member States allege to be supporters of
terrorist groups affiliated with the Taliban and al-Qaeda. This extension of Council jurisdiction
already mirrors a protracted emergency regime in one respect, providing a pretext and perhaps
impetus for rights violations by domestic governments. The Counterterrorism Committee (CTC)
has been criticized for advising countries to amend their laws in ways that violate common
norms and basic human rights; countries such as Belarus have used CTC comments to legitimize
repressive legislation. 310 Meanwhile, the CTC has done little to affect change, consistently
declining to adopt proposals offered by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. 311
Though the multilateral approach to counterterrorism is promising, the failure to adequately
balance security and human rights considerations tarnishes the regime’s centerpiece.
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High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights and follow-up
to the World Conference on Human Rights, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2002/18, at 17-21 (Feb 27, 2002) (annex).
306

71

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS

[2007

1. Due Process and Terrorism as a Threat to International Peace and Security
¶153

In recent years, the Council has more readily used the practice of listing, including the
imposition of sanctions against designated individuals representing “threat[s] to the peace and
national reconciliation process” in Côte d’Ivoire. 312 The significance of due process is not
unfamiliar to the Council, having previously been brought to its attention through the Chapter
VII-based United Nations Compensation Commission313 and an annual General Assembly
resolution urging States to “guarantee the right to due process” while countering terrorism. 314
Despite this attention, protection of due process has been largely absent from the Council listing
process.
¶154
Only recently has an embryonic system of due process protections emerged, after years of
concern that “the way entities or individuals are added to the terrorist list maintained by the
Council and the absence of review or appeal for those listed raise serious accountability issues
and possibly violate fundamental human rights norms and conventions.”315 Yet despite the
revision of CTC guidelines and the creation of a “focal point” within the Secretariat for
processing de-listing requests in Resolution 1730, 316 “it would be a stretch to conclude that the
new [changes] fully respond to due process concerns.”317 Because of the CTC’s consensus rules,
the outcome of de- listing requests still depends on the Member State that initially proposed the
listing. 318 The substance of this “review,” seven years in the making, remains questionable.
¶155
A series of cases from the European Court addressing the resulting deprivation of rights
again highlights the equivalence between unaccountable Chapter VII practice and illegitimate
emergency. The cases of Kadi, Yusuf, Hassan, and Ayadi concern individuals who were added
to the Council list and whose assets were frozen by European Union regulations adopted in
response to the Council’s Chapter VII resolutions. 319 In each, the applicants primarily alleged
violations of their rights under the European Convention and its First Protocol, including a right
to property, a right to a judicial remedy, and a right to non-interference in private life. 320 Finding
that the regulations were “necessary” to implement Council resolutions 321 and applicants’
attempts to distinguish their cases were not dispositive, the Court of First Instance rejected the
312

S.C. Res. 1572, ¶¶ 9-12, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1572 (Nov. 15, 2004); see also S.C. Res. 1727, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1727 (Dec. 15, 2006).
313
S.C. Res. 692, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/0692 (May 20, 1991); The Secretary-General, Report of the SecretaryGeneral Pursuant to Paragraph 19 of Security Council Resolution 687, U.N. Doc. S/22559, ¶ 20 (May 2, 1991)
(“[g]iven the nature of the Commission, it is all the more important that some element of due process be built into
the procedure”).
314
G.A. Res. 60/158, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/158 (Feb. 28, 2006).
315
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S.C. Res. 1730, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1730 (Dec. 19, 2006).
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http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.glKWLeMTIsG/b.2294423/k.3920/January_2007BRTargeted_Sanctions
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E.C.R. II-3553; Case T-315/01, Kadi v. Council of the European Union and Commission of the European
Communities, 2005 E.C.R. 3649; Case T-49/04, Hassan v. Council of the European Union and Commission of the
European Communities 2006 E.C.R. II-52; Case T-253/02, Ayadi v. Council of the European Union and
Commission of the European Communities, 2006 E.C.R. II-2139.
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independent culpability of Community states and instead held that primacy extended to Council
decisions under Chapter VII by virtue of Article 103. 322 Accordingly, the Court observed that it
could not review the lawfulness of decisions of the Council or of the Sanctions Committee
concerning human rights protection, but it could indirectly review Council action to determine its
compliance with jus cogens. 323 Ostensibly proceeding to review the alleged violations under
these latter auspices, the Court borrowed the logic of Bosphorus, an earlier case involving
Council sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, to hold that infringements on the
rights in question were permissible, as they were proportionate to the overriding “fundamental
general interest” of the international community. 324 In this fashion, the Court substituted a hard
look at the non-derogability of the rights involved, indirectly considering the importance of the
justifying threat, for a searching review of Council power. At the same time, it recognized that
cooperation could be implemented in a more narrowly tailored fashion; in dictum, the Court
suggested the need for domestic level hearings to mitigate the negative effects of the
regulations. 325
¶156
From Yusuf to Ayadi, the European Court asserted itself while acquiescing to Council
action in a manner reminiscent of the ICJ in Lockerbie. Noting that its competence was limited
to the periphery of jus cogens, the Court nonetheless engaged in a substantial balancing of the
rights in question as an effective proxy for a more general review of Council action. What is
more, the Court first engaged in a substantive review of the “necessity” of the European
Community’s action in implementing the Council resolution. This review injected into the
jurisprudence not only a “proportionality” discourse through the “general interest” standard, but
also the “necessity” standard common to emergency within the question of attribution. Even
more important, the Court integrated the discourse of emergency into Chapter VII in recognizing
that the rights violations were justified by reference not simply to a resolution, but to the
“fundamental” interest in international peace and security. At the same time, in expanding the
Chapter VII shelter to “authorized” acts of derogation, the Court highlighted the deficiency of
limitations on authorized and delegated action beyond “jus cogens review.” In its shallow
treatment of the principles of necessity and proportionality and unwillingness to seize the
opportunity to pierce the impunity of Council action through its enforcers, the Court avoided a
chance to constitutionally rein in Chapter VII action.
C. Restraints, Guarantors, and Mechanisms at the Level of Implementation
¶157

In providing authorized actors with broad license, Chapter VII shifts the stasis between
law, rights and security. It does so in a manner contemplated by the Charter to confront urgent
and exceptional threats. As translated to the exceptionalism with which Council-authorized
actors have gone about their work, Chapter VII rightly recognizes that common legal rules can
prove to be inapposite in highly idiosyncratic operational contexts. This exceptionalism, though,
is only justified to the extent that it is necessary to achieve operational ends, which the Council
has in turn deemed essential for the restoration or maintenance of international peace and
322

Yusuf, supra note 319, ¶¶ 231, 234, 243; Kadi, supra note 319, ¶¶ 181-204; Hassan, supra note 319, ¶ 92; Ayadi,
supra note 323, ¶ 116.
323
Yusuf, supra note 319, ¶¶ 272, 276, 277; Kadi, supra note 319, ¶¶ 221, 226; Hassan, supra note 319, ¶ 101;
Ayadi, supra note 319, ¶ 116.
324
Case C-84/95, Bosphorus v. Minister for Transp., Energy and Communications, 1996 E.C.R. I-03953, ¶¶ 66-67;
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security. Where unconstrained, it becomes little more than rationalization for cutting corners and
circumventing safeguards. Where recourse to sanctions is absent, exceptionalism not only
threatens populations of individuals with potentially capricious exercises of governmental power,
but also compromises the promotion of the rule of law.
¶158
Again, emergency doctrine is a condign framework protecting against such an outcome,
provided that it can be effectively translated through available oversight mechanisms. The
normative thrust, then, lies in conceptualizing a system of checks against unjustified delegatee
action that can approximate those operating in the ideal realm of emergency, and that still
provide for a commensurate operational flexibility. Though a survey of existing practice reveals
a host of institutional weaknesses, it also presents a matrix of standards and mechanisms which
can potentially provide a sturdy bulwark against illegitimate action under Chapter VII auspices.
1. Human Rights Law
¶159

Enforceability remains the critical limitation preventing human rights law from acting as
an effective restraint on Council authorized or delegated action. The U.N. and its officials are
largely immune to claims of intra vires human rights obligations, as they are not a signatory to
the major human rights instruments and enjoy broad functional immunity. 326 In addition, as the
Al-Jedda and Kadi-Yusuf line of cases indicate, courts have extended the transcendental authority
of Chapter VII beyond immediate Council action to its foreseeable “implementers.” Courts have
chosen not to attribute intra vires authorized action directly to acting states even where standing
would be then possible. Similarly, the courts have not characterized peace operations as Article
29 subsidiary organs with actions imputable to the U.N., which would bind it by “generally
accepted norms of human rights law such as articles 9(5) and 14(6) of the ICCPR” relating to
unlawful detentions and convictions. 327 In both instances, the exceptional nature of Chapter VII
justifies derogations from customary and treaty-based human rights law contained both in
immediate Council decisions and derivative actions.
¶160
What this jurisprudence leaves behind are limits existing primarily at the periphery. In
addition to holding individuals accountable for ultra vires rights violations, the courts have
intervened where actions violate jus cogens. 328 This limited role ho lds some promise insofar as
courts are willing to move beyond Barcelona Traction to recognize a broader list of nonderogable norms of jus cogens. 329 There has been wide support for classifying certain norms
relating to detention as jus cogens. 330 Legal scho lars, practitioners and others have argued that as
326
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a non-negotiable matter extra- legal detention should be used only when “absolutely necessary to
protect national security and public order” and only when subject to certain fundamental judicial
guarantees. 331 The expansion and development of this jus cogens jurisprudence can help to
solidify the outer boundaries of Council action and supplement norms, including necessity and
proportionality principles, to develop a salient, palatable and broad space in which actors can
implement Chapter VII decisions.
2. Humanitarian Law
¶161

International humanitarian law provides an analogue for the limiting effect of emergency
doctrine tailored to the war and post-war context. While recognizing that relaxing legal rules
during an exceptional situation is appropriate, it too seeks to limit this relaxation primarily
through principles of necessity, proportionality and distinction. Obligations under humanitarian
law defined in the Hague Regulations and Geneva Conventions have evolved into customary
norms over the years, comprising a “minimum yardstick” reflecting “elementary considerations
of humanity.”332 Indeed, these norms, specifically designed to address the state of exception,
possess “an absolute and non-derogable character”333 in contrast to the case of human rights law.
¶162
International humanitarian law applies to belligerent conflict as well as occupation. Under
Chapter VII, peace operations have engaged in both situations. 334 Yet, while parallels exist
among belligerency, belligerent occupation and the roles assumed by peace operations, it is an
awkward if not difficult admission for the U.N. to make. 335 As a result, the legal status of the
U.N. vis-à-vis international humanitarian law has long been unclear. 336 Organizations such as the
International Red Cross have argued that the U.N. is subject to international humanitarian law to
the extent it engages in armed enforcement under Chapter VII, but several courts have rejected
such argument. 337 This rule changed in 1999 with the passing of the Secretary-General’s bulletin
on the “Observance by United Nations Forces of International Humanitarian Law.”338 The
bulletin formally recognizes the applicability of International Humanitarian Law to United
Nations peace operations under Chapter VII, and establishes legal consequences through
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prosecution in national courts for violations by authorized actors. 339 It also enumerates a series
of fundamental principles, including certain threadbare safeguards for detention. 340
¶163
It is now widely accepted that humanitarian law applies equally to UN operations and
authorized actors. 341 While the “right of the United Nations force,” or authorized actor, “to
choose methods and means . . . [is] not unlimited,”342 the minimalist provisions of humanitarian
law represent a low threshold for legitimacy. At the same time, in using standards of necessity
and terms of art such as “for imperative reasons of security,” the provisions of international
humanitarian law require standardized, non-arbitrary procedures and corresponding
safeguards. 343
3. Mandate Construction
¶164

A third potential constraint on the scope of authority assigned to authorized actors is
provided by the language of the mandate. Rather than being construed as blanket license for
implementing actors, the mandate imposes tangible limits on operational discretion. If need be,
language should be refined, and mandates narrowly constructed, to achieve this effect. Terms
such as “all necessary means” should not simply endow actors with broad discretion, but impose
a hard constraint of necessity on subsequent action. Guidelines for the use of force, frequently
developed in reports of the Secretary-General and Status of Force and Status of Mission
Agreements, should be included transparently in the mandate itself. The ad hoc nature of
operational practice, which provides little in the way of precedent and regularized doctrine,
underscores the importance of using precise and, where appropriate, limiting language more
generally in the mandate. 344
¶165
Substantive limits in the mandate are also desirable. Territorial and temporal limits on the
mandate itself and invocation of Chapter VII within the mandate would help rein in delegated
actions, as would tighter control and oversight measures including “a clear system of reporting
and accountability.”345 Whether the responsiveness and flexibility of the Council allow for a role
in operational decision- making a priori merits consideration as well. Ultimately, though, as with
human rights, humanitarian law and other standards, mandates ultimately require enforceability.
In the context of peace operations, neither courts nor the Council itself ha ve asserted a strong
role in oversight, allowing for the unsanctioned expansion of delegated powers without
repercussion.
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4. Mechanisms of Review

¶166

The existing accountability system is a weak conglomerate consisting of the binding
authority of judicial review and the political authority of advisory oversight. Judicial review has
not proven to be a reliable guarantor of legitimate Chapter VII action, while advisory bodies, by
virtue of institutional weakness, have been unable to adequately complement judicial
mechanisms. 346
¶167
Assuming more substantive standards are necessary and desirable to guarantee the
legitimacy of Chapter VII-authorized actions, the ambivalent role played by international courts
suggests that a more pluralistic system of accountability might be in order. Expanding the reach
of judicial oversight and “hardening” certain aspects of advisory review could improve the
situation. However, the historical timidity of judicial review in the context of emergency
suggests that such an approach might simply buy a bigger rubber stamp. Rather, the
idiosyncrasies of international law may in fact make inevitable a pluralistic system. 347 The
steadier first step lies in crafting a more coherent system of Chapter VII review at both the
centralized and decentralized (operational) levels by “connecting the dots” and establishing
proper channels between the upper echelons—the Security Council, global review and the
operational level. Such reform should also give affected parties access to review via the legal
standards discussed in this paper.
¶168
At present, several loci of judicial review exist, even as the ICC has thus far written itself
out of the picture. The ICJ presents a potentially formidable check on Council action, but it must
be willing to utilize the standards it has been given to carve out a role within the contours of
exception. Review also exists at the “local” level, although its competence at this point in time
lies primarily in national courts prosecuting the criminal and decidedly ultra vires conduct of
authorized actors. Meanwhile, criminal accountability reform efforts undertaken by the Special
Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and the General Assembly are stagnating. 348
¶169
Host-territory courts and judicial fora designed to address the exception play review roles
as well. For example, the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone expressly provides for
jurisdiction over serious violations of international humanitarian law committed by peace
operations personnel; 349 the Human Rights Chamber for Bosnia and Herzegovina issues final and
binding decisions on applications based on alleged violations of the European Convention or
other accepted agreements. 350 The competence of such courts, however, is not confined to such
matters, nor should the capacity of such courts to review the general legality of Councilauthorized action according to domestic law and international standards be underestimated. The
346
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Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina has long had jurisdiction over whether laws
promulgated by the U.N. operation comply with the Bosnian Constitution, international human
rights law, and general rules of public international law. 351 Subsidiary organs have also shown
themselves able to pierce the Council’s veil in remedying rights violations. In Kosovo, a
Detention Review Commission capable of invalidating executive orders was established by
Regulation 2001/18, though its questionable independence has left its potential largely
untapped. 352 Recently, in Prosecutor v. Rwamakuba, the ICTR held itself bound to “generally
accepted human rights norms,” and consequently found that its inherent powers gave it the
authority to provide compensation for the violation of a defendant’s right to legal assistance. 353
In connecting the dots between the affected party, liability for Council-authorized action and a
tangible remedy (in the instant case, US$2,000), Rwamakuba represents a significant step
forward in developing a limiting jurisprudence.
¶170
The ICTR’s ability to effectuate its determinations stands in stark contrast to the persuasive
authority of several mission-specific oversight bodies. Mission- level ombudsperson institutions
and human rights advisory panels have been endorsed as “essential” operational components, 354
despite their legal impotence. The plight of the Ombudsperson Institution in Kosovo is
instructive. 355 The office was established by UNMIK Regulation 2000/38 to respond to
complaints and open investigations concerning human rights violations, administration policies
and legislation to ensure their compliance with the requirements of good governance. 356
However, its jurisdiction does not extend to all authorized actors (most notably KFOR), and the
remedies at its disposal are few. Although the Ombudsperson may correspond with civil
authorities, offer recommendations and issue special reports for more egregious and widespread
problems, it cannot issue binding decisions, nor can it affect judicial decisions or directly
investigate criminal matters. 357 As a result, both UNMIK and the PISG have been dismissive and
uncooperative towards the Ombudsperson Institution. 358
¶171
Integrating the Ombudsperson Institution into a more standardized regime of Chapter VII
oversight would likely ameliorate these limitations. Early inclusion of the institution in
mandates extending its jurisdiction to cover a broader spectrum of actors and norms and
enhancing its factfinding powers would help in this respect. So too would placing the
ombudsperson within a larger system at the mission level, as the preliminary liaison between
aggrieved parties and more formal oversight mechanisms, and at the international level, as an
agent of a larger standing international ombudsperson institution. Notably, the Generally
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Assembly has discussed the seedlings of such a proposal as part of it broader consideration of the
“Administration of Justice at the United Nations.”359
¶172
Room for improving top-down oversight over authorized action and delegated power exists
as well. Models for implementing such a plan range from the World Bank Inspection Panel to
the previously discussed Council Counterterrorism Committees 360 and the freestanding
Counterterrorism Executive Directorate. The Peacebuilding Commission provides a potentially
ready-made oversight mechanism, though its rules of procedure and general modus operandi
would differ significantly with such a mandate. The domestic context provides another
framework in the form of a State of Emergency Inquiry Board like that employed by Ethiopia. 361
A freestanding Chapter VII Inquiry Board, Commission or Committee could serve several
functions limiting the authority of the Council and authorized actions alike. It could make
transparent alleged “transgressions,” inspect and review allegations according to consistent and
recognized standards of exception, and recommend corrective action to the Council.
¶173
Certainly, such frameworks for improving oversight may be viable, but to be effective the y
must exist strategically within, and perhaps at the helm of, a broader system of oversight.
Otherwise, the crystallizing congruency between Chapter VII and emergency at the level of
implementation will continue to hinder accountable and effective practice.
V. CONCLUSION
¶174

The word “accountability” is often used as a “protean concept, a placeholder for multiple
contemporary anxieties.”362 It too easily becomes a catch-all, encompassing matters of
legitimacy, legality, merit and efficacy. As used, the term speaks to “answerability,” insofar as it
seeks to ensure that defined and enforceable limits to actors’ discretion exist. With the
conflation of Chapter VII and exception at the level of implementation, the force of these limits
diminishes. The Council and authorized actors have been complicit in this trend, excusing their
own transgressions by reference to the beneficial ends of their work. Whether the imperative of
international security is invoked as an after-the- fact rationalization for derogations, or is in fact
part of the preliminary calculus leading thereto, the normative exceptionalism of Chapter VII is
crystallized, and without corresponding limits the notion of a lawless and unanswerable cadre of
actors is reinforced.
¶175
Exceptionalism, though, does not equate with categorical impunity. 363 The integrity of the
constitutional system established by the Charter requires that different limits on Council and
Council-authorized action exist, limits discernable by specific reference to the exception.
Although the maintenance of peace and security may in fact sit in a position of primacy vis-à-vis
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the other functions of the U.N., 364 the values of constitutionalism and legitimacy are served by
giving due regard to both sides in reconciliation. If the state of exc eption mindset is to persist, its
validity—and that of the Council, authorized actors and multilateralism more generally—
depends on the authority of such a system of oversight. If not, actors flaunting legalism under
the banner of the UN promise to sever the organization from the nobility of its ends.
¶176
The danger of Chapter VII anomie is real. To assure the continued celerity, flexibility and
effectiveness of Council action while simultaneously respecting the intended limits of the
Charter, a new paradigm appreciating the Council’s polyglot nature is in order. The regulative
ideal of legitimate emergency doctrine provides just such a framework, highlighting deficiencies
in past and current praxis while providing an archetypal system through which these issues can
be addressed. As clamoring for Security Council reform reaches a crescendo (while inching
tediously towards fruition), the value of such an architecture is particularly propitious. For in the
end, the more effective and attainable path to the ostensible goals of reform might well be
through the Council’s domain, as opposed to its membership. Time will tell.
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